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USING OUR BRAINS: WHAT COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY TEACH US ABOUT TEACHING LAW
STUDENTS TO MAKE ETHICAL, PROFESSIONALLY
RESPONSIBLE, CHOICES
Alan M. Lerner1
ABSTRACT
Throughout our lives, below the level of our consciousness, each of
us develops values, intuitions, expectations, and needs that powerfully
affect both our perceptions and our judgments. Placed in situations in
which we feel threatened, or which implicate our values, our brains,
relying on those implicitly learned, emotionally weighted, memories,
may react automatically, without reflection or the opportunity for
reflective interdiction. We can “downshift,” to primitive, self-protective
problem solving techniques. Because these processes operate below the
radar of our consciousness, automatic, “emotional” reaction, rather than
thoughtful, reasoned analysis may drive our responses to stressful
questions of ethics and professional responsibility.

1. Practice Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. This paper
has been several years in the making, and while I take full responsibility for it, I must
express profound appreciation for the many people whose support and encouragement
were essential to its completion. Professor Mike Rutherford, and Dr. Kathy Hirsh-Pasek
to whom I first floated my thesis encouraged me to pursue it, despite my lack of
scientific background, and pointed me in the direction to learn the essential background
science. When I had completed a draft, Dr. Hirsh-Pasek, Dr. Julio Kuperman, and Dr.
Matthew Lattel gave me helpful suggestions for making the scientific portion more
precise and understandable. The folks at the UCLA/University of London IALS Fifth
International Conference on Clinical Legal Education, encouraged me to present the
paper even though I had completed only a preliminary draft, and Dr. Hirsh-Pasek and
Michael Pasek convinced me of the appropriateness of presenting it aided by
PowerPoint, then taught me how to do it. My clinical colleagues at Penn, and the MidAtlantic Clinicians’ Conference, and the participants in the Penn Law School Faculty
Summer Colloquium listened patiently, and made very helpful suggestions for making
the paper more accessible. I have been privileged to have been aided by an extraordinary
group of research assistants over the past several years, including Steven Ebert,
Stephanie Vogel, Elisa Behar, Tracey Sorens, Christine Hoyler, and Mariana Kuperman.
I am especially indebted to researchers Adam Sundor, Theresa Keeley, and Nicole
Isaacs and librarian Merle Slyhoff, without whose thoughtful and tireless work, I
certainly would not have completed the paper before retirement. Without the assistance
of Sylvia Bloise and Kelly Colgan-Azar, this paper would still be purely a stream of
consciousness rambling, totally without form.
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Lawyers continually face complex problems of great moment to
their clients and the community, problems which may implicate their
own professional values. They need to learn to address these problems
thoughtfully and effectively while carrying out their professional
responsibilities as representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial
system, and public citizens, exercising both their analytical skills, and
moral judgment. To do so, they need to understand their own emotional
processes and the content of their intuitions, and have the skills, and the
confidence in their ability, to act appropriately. Unfortunately,
traditional legal education focuses on teaching students “legal analysis”
of a given set of facts, in which the answer is the formation of a legal
rule, the role of the lawyer is to achieve the client’s stated goal, and
other values are, at best, minimally relevant.
This paper analyzes recent discoveries in cognitive science and
social psychology that explain the brain’s learning and problem solving
mechanisms, and applies that scientific knowledge to demonstrate why
traditional legal education may actually impair the ability to effectively
solve complex problems, particularly those freighted with issues of
personal values and professional responsibility. It then describes an
alternative pedagogy, problem-based learning, that provides valuable
insights to teaching law students to become ethical practitioners.
I. WHAT ARE LAW STUDENTS TAUGHT ABOUT RESPONDING TO
ETHICAL PROBLEMS?
A. Examples from Lawyering: The Real World

Case #1
A bright, honest, and hard working fourth year associate, in whom
all of the partners saw the potential for partnership, was investigating a
discrimination charge brought by a former employee of the firm’s client.
She decided that a fellow employee might have some important
information. After getting the client’s approval to interview him, she
telephoned him to arrange a meeting to discuss the case. The employee
asked her whether the call was about some problem with his work. She
told him “no,” that everything was fine with him, but that as counsel to
the company, she needed to talk to him about a matter relating to
another person she was investigating, whom she then identified. The
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employee also said that since he still saw the former employee from
time to time, he did not want the former employee to know he said
anything negative about him. The associate assured the employee that
their conversation would be confidential. The employee then agreed to
meet the next day at the law firm’s office.
In fact, the associate did not know whether the work of the
employee to whom she was talking was fine, nor had she been
authorized by the client to tell the employee that. Moreover, while she
was not a “blabber mouth,” she had every intention, in accordance with
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct,2 to report to her client
what she learned from the interview.
Case #2
Associate to Partner: “I’ve met with the client in the XYZ matter,
gone over the interrogatories and document requests we got from the
other side, reviewed our client’s draft answers, and the documents they
have found that respond to the requests. I think I have a pretty good
idea of what we can answer and what we can object to as being unduly
burdensome or not likely to lead to relevant evidence. Do you want me
to draft a set of responses for you to review before they go out to the
client, or to draft a memo to you explaining what I’ve found, and how I
think we should respond?”
Partner to Associate: “As I recall, these are their first discovery
requests to us, so why don’t you object to all of their interrogatories and
document requests? I am sure that you can find some basis to do so.
When they come back to us to negotiate, which they have to do before
they can file any motion to compel, we’ll be in a better position to see
what they really want and to negotiate from there.”
The associate left the partner’s office, presumably to do as he had
been instructed.
In Case #1, the well meaning associate may have violated Rules
4.1(a)3 and 4.34 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. First, she
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 [hereinafter “MODEL RULES”]
(stating that “[a] lawyer shall keep the client reasonable informed about the status of the
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information” and “shall
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation”).
3. See MODEL RULES R. 4.1 (a).
4. See MODEL RULES R. 4.3.
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told the employee that he had done nothing wrong, implying that she
knew that to be a fact, when she did not.5 Then, she represented to the
employee that what he told her would be “confidential” in a situation in
which he reasonably would have thought that she would tell no one else,
although the “confidentiality” of which the lawyer was speaking does
not prohibit her from telling her client, the employer.6 Indeed, she may
be bound to disclose what she learns to the employer even if it
implicates this employee in wrongdoing.7 At the same time, she may
have violated Rule 1.6,8 when she disclosed to the prospective
interviewee that there was nothing wrong with his performance, a fact
that she could have learned only from the client, and made the
disclosure without the client’s permission.
In Case #2, the partner may well be counseling the associate to
violate Rule 3.19 by asserting an issue—objections to the discovery
requests—without a “basis for doing so that is not frivolous.” This
would be particularly likely where the partner has not reviewed the
discovery requests, and thus had no basis to assume that all of them
were legitimately subject to objection. If the case is pending in the
federal court or in the court of a state having a rule similar to Rule 11, or
26(g)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,10 the partner may also
be counseling the associate to violate those rules.

5. See MODEL RULES R. 4.1 (a) (stating that “in the course of representing a client
a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a
third person”).
6. The Model Rules state that:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a
lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands
the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct
the misunderstanding.

See MODEL RULES R. 4.3.
7. See MODEL RULES R. 1.4 (holding that “(a) A lawyer shall keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter; (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions about
the representation”).
8. MODEL RULES R. 1.6 (explaining that “A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except
for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation. . .”).
9. See MODEL RULES R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal in existing law.”)
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 26(G)(2).
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To me, the examples11 demonstrate two problems of professional
responsibility: (1) an attorney who, in the daily pressure to zealously
represent the client, simply does not bring to consciousness a significant
question of professional responsibility; (2) an associate who is told by a
more senior lawyer to do something that might well raise a significant
question of professional responsibility, and fails to question the
instruction, because he doesn’t recognize the problem, assumes there
might be a problem but that the senior lawyer, being older, wiser, and
more experienced, knows better, or considers the ethical problem, but,
fears demonstrating disloyalty to the client and/or the senior lawyer.
Case #3
An attorney was representing a parent in a custody dispute
involving their ten year old child. The parents had been separated since
the child was six years old. The opposing party had “primary” custody
and the client had “partial” custody (or “visitation”). The client had
begun the custody proceeding desiring to obtain primary custody,
believing that he/she could be a better parent. The child, however, was
thriving in the current living arrangement, physically healthy, doing
well in school both academically and socially, demonstrating
appropriate behaviors at home, with the client during weekends and
extended times there, at school, and with friends in the neighborhood.
In addition, the child had recently begun singing in the church’s
children’s choir and seemed to enjoy that activity very much.
Shortly before the date of the hearing, the client arrived at the
lawyer’s office to prepare. The client informed the lawyer that he/she
had some new information that should help considerably. The client
had recently learned that the custodial parent had been living with a
partner of the same sex in a homosexual relationship. The lawyer
responded by asking how the client believed that relationship might
affect the child. The client responded that homosexuality was immoral,
and that living in a household of such blatant immorality would
permanently damage the child, and perhaps lead the child to adopt
homosexuality as a way of life. The lawyer sought, but got nothing
more from the client in the way of evidence of harm to the child.

11. Both of these incidents arose at highly respected law firms. In the course of my
exposure to litigation as a law clerk for a federal district court judge and as a lawyer for
more than thirty-five years, I experienced, firsthand, and frequently heard of other,
numerous incidents of these kinds of, at least arguable, ethical failings.

648

QLR

[Vol. 23:643

Under the law of the state in which the matter was pending, a
parent’s sexual orientation is entirely irrelevant to custody unless there
is evidence that it is causing some harm to the child. The client’s fear
that the child was in a sinful environment based upon the homosexual
relationship of the other parent is a matter of religious difference
between the parents and, absent some palpable harm to the child, that
too, was irrelevant.
At the same time, the lawyer knew that the judge before whom the
matter was to be heard had a reputation as a homophobe. The lawyer
believed that if the situation was brought to the judge’s attention, he
would likely decide the matter in his client’s favor, and that if there was
an appeal, the judge would write an opinion explaining the decision on
grounds totally unrelated to the evidence of the other parent’s
homosexuality.
Should the lawyer, in an opening statement, in questioning the
opposing party, or in some other way, bring out the issue of the other
parent’s living situation in order to influence the judge? I have asked
that question on many occasions to law students and lawyers. Almost to
a person, the unhesitating response is that the lawyer, in the zealous
representation of his client, should find a way to reveal the living
arrangements even without any evidence of adverse affect on the child.
If opposing counsel fails to object, or if he does object and the objection
is overruled, that is not the questioner’s concern in our system. As to
what the judge decides, and how he explains his decision in an opinion,
that is up to the judge, not the lawyer.
“But what about Rule 3.1?”12 The answer, invariably, is that as an
advocate for my client in our adversary system, I don’t have to make
objections to my own questions, that is for my opponent; nor do I make
the rulings on evidence, that is for the judge, and Rule 3.1 doesn’t
require anything else. Occasionally a lawyer or law student seeks to
“fight the hypo” by arguing that if my client thinks that living in the
other parent’s household is harmful to the child, perhaps it is, in some
way we don’t yet understand. Thus, the question is not improper.
Rather than even concede that there is an ethical question, the law
students and lawyers present arguments (the zealous advocate in the
adversarial system) for their client’s desired position.
The associates in both cases #1 and #2 graduated from excellent
law schools, and had been on their respective schools’ Law Reviews.

12.

See MODEL RULES R. 3.1.
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Presumably both had passed the school’s course on legal ethics, as well
as the MPRE. The lawyer in case #3, a pre-1974 law school graduate,
was experienced and well respected among his peers. If you asked the
first associate directly whether it is permissible to lie to a witness about
some fact relevant to the witness, whether she was free to disclose
information about the employee’s employment with a client without the
client’s permission, or whether she was free not to tell the witness that
her interest as counsel for the client and his interest might be adverse, I
have no doubt that she would have quickly answered, “No” to all three
questions. If you asked the associate in Case #2 whether he had an
obligation to respond to discovery requests in good faith, rather than
simply delay and force the requesting party to negotiate without any
good faith objection to particular interrogatories or document requests, I
suspect that he would have answered in the affirmative. Indeed, I am
quite certain, knowing the partner in case #2, as I do, that if the partner
was asked a similar question in a general form, not related to a specific
matter in which he was involved, he, too, would have immediately
answered “yes.” If you had asked lawyer #3 if it is permissible to
proffer evidence one knows to be inadmissible, I believe that he would
have answered in the negative. So, why had each of these lawyers acted
as they did?
Case # 413
There is a scene at the beginning of the movie,
“PHILADELPHIA”14 in which Tom Hanks comes into Denzel
Washington’s law office seeking representation to sue his former law
firm for wrongful termination. Hanks is a young lawyer who has
recently been fired because, he believes, the firm’s management
discovered that he had AIDS. Washington, an apparently successful,
contingent fee, plaintiffs’ lawyer, declines the representation because of
Hanks’ illness. What gives the scene particular bite is that Hanks was
preceded into Washington’s office by a man who wanted representation
to sue the city for negligence. It seems that there was a hole in the
middle of the street where the city was having some construction done,
13. While this example is from a movie, as opposed to the actual experience, the
reality that many of us see every day is that civil legal services organizations seem
forever to be narrowing the scope of cases they can take, and closing intake of new
cases, while bar association pro bono organizations are always short of volunteers, even
for cases that appear to have merit.
14. PHILADELPHIA (TriStar Pictures 1993).
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the location was in mid-block, rather than in a pedestrian crosswalk, and
the construction site was clearly marked off by yellow warning tape.
Nevertheless, the prospective plaintiff managed to find and fall into the
hole. Even Washington seems surprised, after asking in vain for
evidence of mitigating circumstances, to find that the man still wants to
sue. Despite these extraordinary facts, Washington readily agrees to
represent the injured man, and even refers him for examination by a
doctor that Washington apparently uses in such cases.
B. Learning Does Not Necessarily Lead to Doing.
Learning the Rules of Professional Conduct does not necessarily
lead to ethical practice.
Moral life is not to be confused with tests meant to measure certain kinds of
abstract (moral) thinking, or with tests that give people a chance to offer
hypothetical responses to made-up scenarios. We never quite know what will
happen in this life; nor do we know how an event will connect with
15
ourselves.

The associate in Case #1 was assigned to obtain information for
her client’s defense of a claim against it. Her conduct was both logical
and truthful, and her purpose innocuous. While truthfulness and benign
purpose are relevant, they are not sufficient to satisfy the Rules of
Professional Responsibility. She had probably studied Rules 1.6, 4.1,
4.3, and 4.4 in her Professional Responsibility course and in preparation
for the MPRE.16 However, in all likelihood, her study of those rules
was explicit—the class knew in advance that the treatment of those rules
was to be covered in the readings and class. And more likely than not,
the cases and hypos would have focused on sharing information that
might be harmful or embarrassing to the client, sharing information
which the client does not want shared (Rule 1.6),17 or speaking or
withholding information in order to take advantage of the third party.

15. ROBERT COLES, MORAL LIFE OF CHILDREN, 29 (Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press
1986).
16. She might also have had a course in employment law; however, unless she
attended a school that had adopted Deborah Rhode’s “Pervasive Method” of teaching
ethics, DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE
METHOD (2d ed., 1995), or something similar, it is unlikely that concern for ethical
questions which might arise in the course of investigation of an employment case would
have been included in such a course.
17. See MODEL RULES R. 1.6.
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(Rules 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4)18 Here, that was not the case. Hence, whatever
memory she retained about the application of the Rules of Professional
Conduct from those classes would not necessarily connect with the cues
from her experience in “real life.”
The associate in Case #2 may have had a similar non-recognition
experience to that of the associate in Case #1. However, let us assume
that he actually did consider whether the instruction from the partner
was ethically appropriate. At that point, he would have faced a
dilemma. Should he, a young and aspiring associate, question a more
senior lawyer, especially where that lawyer’s directive seems more
likely to serve the client’s goal of the successful outcome of the
litigation—a goal which the associate is bound to pursue, under Rule
1.2(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct?19 The associate has been
taught both in law school, and since entering practice, that he is bound
to pursue the client’s lawful goals. Should he deviate from that precept
in a matter which would require him to question the partner’s ethics?
Answering that question could lead to sweaty palms, or worse.
What does the associate’s brain do when faced with this problem?
The associate needs, in Case #1, to secure the witness’s information in
order to be successful in representing her client, and thus satisfying her
boss. In Case #2 the associate needs to avoid conflict with his boss. As
I will argue below, our motivation significantly affects our analysis of
problems with which we are faced, even when those goals appear to
conflict with the clear meaning of the data.20 Thus, in both cases, the
associates’ needs powerfully affected their judgment as to what
behavior was appropriate, despite what they might know about the
constraints of the Rules of Professional Conduct. When the conflict

18. See id. at R. 4.1, 4.3. See also MODEL RULES R. 4.4 (providing that “In
representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantiated purpose
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third party, or use methods of obtaining
evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.”).
19. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a).
20. Ziva Kunda noted that:
[M]otivation and affect influence judgment by influencing the cognitive processes
we engage in to arrive at a judgment. Both motivation and affect may influence
which concepts, beliefs, and rules we apply to a judgment; we may be especially
likely to apply those that are congruent with our goals and moods. Motivation and
affect may also influence our mode of processing information, determining
whether we rely on quick and easy inferential shortcuts or rely on elaborate,
systematic reasoning.

See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION, MAKING SENSE
Tech., 1999).

OF

PEOPLE 211 (Mass. Inst. of
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between our goals and other values is serious enough to produce severe
stress, our brains might well “downshift” into survival mode—fight or
flight. 21 In Case #2, fight is not readily available, since there is no one
to fight with except the partner, and that doesn’t seem likely to make
things better. If he challenges the partner’s ethics, even if he is right,
and almost certainly if he is wrong, his job, his income, his future as a
lawyer may be in jeopardy. Flight, for the associate in this case, means
denial that this is his problem. That is, acceding to the assumed wisdom
of the partner. Alternatively, the associate might think that he might be
right even if he is only a second year associate. In that case the “flight”
response is to return to the “tried and true,” that is, to some problem
solving mechanism that he has used successfully in “the law” before.22
Inevitably, we look for solutions to problems we face by first
scanning our memories for similar situations, and applying the
principles and methods that we used in those situations. In the case of
lawyers, particularly newer lawyers, our memories for solving legal
problems were created in law school.23
I suggest that the fundamental problem solving principles that our
students are taught in law school are:
1. The answer lies in the formulation of a legal rule;
2. My role as a lawyer, i.e., a “zealous advocate,” is to help my
client achieve his goal, regardless of what the law seems to be. Lawyers
help their clients achieve their goals principally by building arguments
that will lead to the application of the desired legal rule to the client’s
situation.
3. Neither my personal values, nor the interests of third parties are
to be considered in the pursuit of my client’s goals.24
Applying those principles, the associate in case #2 might examine
Rule 3.1, the apparently governing legal rule: “A lawyer shall
not. . . .defend a proceeding, or. . . controvert an issue therein, unless
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law.”25
Perhaps he would argue that Rule 3.1 does not apply because nonresponsiveness to discovery requests is not “defend[ing] a proceeding or

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See discussion infra, p. 678.
See id.
See id.
See discussion infra, pp. 653-54.
MODEL RULES R. 3.1.
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controvert[ing] an issue therein. . . .” thereby obviating the fear of
violation of the Rules. He can then go back to the individual discovery
requests and re-examine them to see if he can so interpret them as to
find a basis for asserting that “the information sought [does not] appear
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”
under Rule 26 (b)(1)26 or come up with some other acceptable objection.
Since, whether this process satisfied his personal values or unduly
burdened the opposing party or its counsel is irrelevant under the “three
principles,” his post-hoc rationale, carried out in accordance with his
law school learning about how to be a lawyer, would provide him with a
basis, morally justifiable to himself, for following the partner’s
direction.
Similarly, in Case #3, the lawyer may well resort to the above
principles by first making an argument that the introduction of the
inadmissible evidence does not raise an ethical issue based upon the
argument that the admissibility of the evidence in question is not a
“proceeding” or an “issue” in a proceeding, because the latter refers to a
substantive issue. Alternatively, it is simply not part of his “role” as a
zealous advocate for his client to avoid proffering evidence merely
because the other party might object and the judge might sustain the
objection. The attorney might also argue that he is, in good faith,
arguing for “an extension, modification or reversal” of the otherwise
applicable rule as to the admissibility of such evidence, or at least that
he needs to preserve his ability to do so on appeal by raising the matter
at the trial level.27
C. What’s Wrong With this Picture? And Why?
In each of the examples, the lawyer was faced with a situation
which posed a complex problem with significant risks—problems that
threatened to lead them away from “zealously,” and perhaps

26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (claiming that “Relevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”).
27. The Federal Rules of Evidence explain the concept of offer of proof as:
In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which
questions were asked. Once the court makes a definite ruling on the record
admitting or excluding evidence, wither at or before trial, a party need not renew
an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.

See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2)
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successfully, pursuing their clients’ expressed goals. In Case #1 the
problem was how to get important information from an individual who
was fearful that disclosure that might harm her. In Case #2, the problem
was responding to discovery without giving away information
unnecessarily, and when a more senior lawyer has told you to respond in
a manner that you think might be unethical. In Case #3, the problem is
how to win the case, and appear to be zealously representing your client,
while not using evidence that, to the client is clearly both critically
relevant and highly persuasive, but to the experienced lawyer is clearly
inadmissible. Lawyers face such situations frequently. Indeed, it can be
said that the most important work that lawyers do is to solve complex
problems, whether of ethics, or otherwise.28 While law schools make
some effort to teach students analytical tools for addressing those
situations, the curriculum and pedagogy of most law schools effectively
teaches them how to solve only a very narrow range of problems, using
a very narrow range of their problem solving tools.29
Observing Denzel Washington’s choice not to represent Tom
Hanks in PHILADELPHIA, one might argue (as many of my students
have) that a lawyer in private practice is free to decline to represent
anyone that he/she chooses. Yet, we also know that our legal system
assumes that competent representation is essential for anyone who seeks
redress in our courts. The Supreme Court has held that representation is

28. Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science,
and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 313, 315 (1995) (promoting the use of
cognitive science to help understand how lawyers make decisions and arguing that in
order to be more effective problem solvers, students need practice solving problems, a
skill not emphasized in most law schools); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:
ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY, 101 (Oceana Publications 1951) (arguing that lawyers,
through “human ingenuity,” keep the law and the legal system, as well as the legal tools
available to commercial enterprises, on pace with our constantly evolving society); Alan
M. Lerner, Law & Lawyering in the Workplace: Building Better Lawyers by Teaching
Students to Exercise Critical Judgment as Creative Problem Solvers, 32 AKRON L. REV.
107, 109-112 (1999) (emphasizing the importance of lawyers exercising critical
judgment in solving problems); Paul Brest, The Responsibility of Law Schools:
Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problems Solvers, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
5, 6 (1995) (criticizing law schools’ failure to adequately prepare students in skills
beyond doctrine and legal analysis and proposing as an alternative courses which
integrate “insights” from disciplines such as economics, psychology, and business);
Thomas D. Barton, Conceiving the Lawyer as Creative Problem Solver: Introduction,
34 CAL. W. L. REV. 267, 267-270 (1998) (stressing the importance of creative problem
solving in law).
29. Blasi, supra note 28, at 319, 359-360, 386-387; see also, Steven I. Friedland,
How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching Techniques in American Law Schools, 20
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1996).
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mandatory in serious criminal cases30 though not in civil cases.31
However, the Model Rules encourage lawyers to engage in “pro bono
publico service,” and cases such as Hanks’s fit precisely within the
classes of cases identified in the rule.32 The fact that Hanks had been
turned down by ten other lawyers, and that Washington was his last
hope did not move Washington, even to make the superficial inquiry
about the potential legal merits of the claim, as he had with the previous
client with a facially questionable claim.
The four examples thus demonstrate, as Robert Coles argued,33 that
knowledge of the rules and legal analysis that we teach do not
necessarily lead to ethical, professionally responsible action.
And while law schools regularly give public kudos to lawyers who
perform work in the public interest, in their classes, they provide no
exposure to difficult questions concerning how students’ personal
values should influence their professional choices of clients, or their
professional behavior, what, if any, pro bono work to do, how to
balance pro bono work with fee generating work, or how to deal with
superiors in one’s law firm whose focus may be on billable hours and
litigation outcomes, rather than on the aspirations of Rule 6.1, or some
concept of ethical and professional practice. Consequently, students
emerge from law school either not steeped in the values of public
service and the responsibility of lawyers to assure that individuals have
access to legal services, or lacking the tools to navigate both the
economic demands of the private practice of law, and the urgings of
Rule 6.1, as they reflect genuine need within our communities. And,
when confronted with ethical problems, they make arguments to justify
doing what will most likely lead to the result sought by the client, or the
senior partner, regardless of the spirit of the rules, their own values, or
the public interest.
It is, therefore, not surprising that Dean Mark A. Sargent
expressed such skepticism about lawyers being positively moved to
behave more ethically even in the face of the mandates and potential
penalties of the recently promulgated Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,34
30. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durham County, North Carolina, 452
U.S. 18 (1981).
32. MODEL RULES R. 6.1(a) (1) and (b) (1) and (2) (ABA).
33. COLES, supra note 15, at 29.
34. Final Rule: Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys, 68 Fed. Reg. 6295 (Feb. 6, 2003), codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205.
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concluding, that “[t]he mere existence of the rules may have a deterrent
effect on many cautious and conscientious lawyers, but if the kinds of
firms that actively or passively contributed to the egregious behavior of
corporate clients such as Enron, WorldCom and so many others are
dominated by a moral consciousness that encourages endless
rationalization and willful blindness, then the deterrent effect is likely to
be minimal.”35
Thus, the legal academy should be asking whether the prevailing
curriculum fails to support, or may actually impede students’
development as both effective, and professionally responsible, ethical
lawyers, and whether we can do better.36
One reason for our persistence on our current path is, I believe, that
we have not incorporated into our teaching scientific discoveries over
the past two or three decades about how people learn, what inhibits and
enhances their effective use of what we teach, and the effective use of
learning to address emerging problems, particularly when those
problems are professionally threatening to them.
The legal literature contains a number of examples of experiments
with teaching professional responsibility using experiential methods.37
35. Mark A. Sargent, Lawyers in the Moral Maze, 49 VILL. L.REV. 867, 884
(2004).
36. In 1998, Professor Susan Sturm and I developed a first year elective course
designed to teach problem solving to law students in the second semester of the first
year, by creating a series of simulations in which they would be placed in role and asked
to create a solution to the problem. Lerner, supra note 28, at 109-110 nn.2-3. In the first
role play in which the students were assigned to represent one of four parties engaged in
a dispute, we asked them to prepare a letter to their respective clients explaining the case
and making a recommendation as to what the client should do. Although the problem
did not say that litigation had been started, or even was contemplated, by any party,
every student assumed that they were already in litigation in court, and addressed only
the potential litigation strategies in their letters to their clients. Id. at 123-124.
37. See, e.g., Douglas N. Frenkel, On Trying to Teach Judgment, 12 LEGAL EDUC.
REV. 19 (2001) (sharing the author’s experience teaching professional responsibility to
upper-year students through the use of real world dilemmas that evoke student responses
on both an intellectual and emotional level, student participation, and occasional role
plays); Eleanor W. Myers, Teaching Good and Teaching Well: Integrating Values with
Theory and Practice, 47 J. LEGAL ED. 401 (1997) (relating the author’s experience
teaching the two semester “Integrated Transactional Practice” course which includes
trusts and estates, professional responsibility, interviewing, negotiating, counseling, and
drafting); Steven Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential
Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505, 522-528, 532-535 (1995) (discussing the author’s
experience of how teaching a professional responsibility course centered on student
group interaction and collaboration to solve problems rather than teacher led discussions
improved the students’ moral reasoning); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good
Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995)
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There are also articles which seek to explain why experiential pedagogy
can be expected to produce more effective learning in this area than
other methods.38 Conversely, I have, too often, heard from fellow law
teachers that, starting with students who have spent the first 22 or more,
formative years of their lives developing their character—for better or
for worse—our three years of law school cannot possibly be expected to
have any impact on the ethics and professional responsibility of the
graduates that we send out into the profession and the world.39 Yet
there is also evidence that professional school may be an ideal place to
teach ethical decision making.40
With that in mind, I propose to (a) examine recent discoveries in
cognitive science about how humans learn and what affects their ability
to apply what they have learned to new situations, (b) assess how that
data relates to how we educate our students, and (c) identify approaches
to teaching that I submit will enable us to help our students become
more ethical, professionally responsible lawyers. Part II of this paper
will discuss applicable scientific principles of learning and problem
solving. Part III will compare those principles with the strategy,

(discussing the authors’ incorporation of a legal ethics course with a clinical one in
which students met weekly specifically to discuss ethical issues arising in their clinical
work); Barton, supra note 28; SYMPOSIUM, TEACHING ETHICS, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. (Summer/ Autumn 1995) (collecting more than twenty articles discussing
experiments in teaching legal ethics at various law school which received grants fro that
purpose from the Keck Foundation).
38. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 28, at 315, 320; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical
Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612 (1984)
(hypothesizing that in the future, law schools will have realized that concentrating solely
on teaching students doctrinal analysis and case interpretation is too narrow and illprepares them; rather, schools should focus on teaching students how to learn law from
the exercise of practicing); Stephen McG. Bundy, Teaching Legal Ethics: Improving the
Required Ethics Course, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19 (1995) (discussing Boalt Hall’s
experiment with teaching the required professional responsibility course in the first year
and the school’s ultimate decision to return it to the upper-year curriculum).
39. See Luban & Millemann’s discussion of “The Problem of Excessive
Engagement,” supra note 37, at 83-86 (exploring how students often reexamined their
positions and changed their viewpoints after participating in clinical work, but if their
exposure was limited to classroom learning only, their views were unchanged); Susan P.
Koniak & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, 58 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 118, 120 (1995) (promoting the importance of pervasively teaching legal ethics
and noting that the failure to do so risks sending the message that there is no problem
with behaving unethically); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Symposium, The Legal Profession:
The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 239, 240 (1998) (discussing
the failure of law schools to teach ethics).
40. See James R. Rest, Can Ethics Be Taught In Professional School? Easier Said
Than Done, PSYCHOL. RES., Winter 1988 at 22.
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process, and effect of traditional Langdellian / Socratic teaching. In Part
IV, I will attempt to demonstrate why experiential, highly
contextualized, behaviorally oriented, problem based teaching is likely
to be more effective than traditional pedagogy in producing lawyers
who are ethical and professionally responsible.
II. THE HUMAN BRAIN IS A PROBLEM SOLVING MACHINE .
To use a modern business metaphor, learning and solving problems
are part of the “core business” of the human brain. One cogent example
is that of learning language. Virtually every child is born with the
capacity to learn language. Without taking a single lesson, they learn to
understand and communicate in the language, or languages, that are
most prevalent in their environment. Where spoken language is the
norm, they learn by hearing, then orally communicating. Where signing
is the norm, they learn to understand and then to communicate in sign.41
Only thereafter do they learn to communicate through reading and
writing. Clearly “the brain” comes equipped to solve the problem of
communication, and it accomplishes that goal by learning from its
environment.
Another example is the use of logic. While there are substantial
variances among individuals in their ability to use logic, the human
brain seems to find logic compelling, if not irresistible. As Steven
Pinker has observed:
All languages have logical terms like not, and, same,
equivalent, and opposite. Children use and, not, or, and if
appropriately before they turn three, not only in English but in
half a dozen other languages that have been studied. Logical

41. For a more detailed discussion see MARC MARSCHARK, PSYCHOLOGICAL
DEVELOPMENT OF DEAF CHILDREN 98, 107 (Oxford University Press 1993) reviewing
the literature reporting research as to language acquisition among deaf children, and
concluding that “[s]ign language clearly can serve as an effective mode of
communication for young deaf children and reveals typical stages of normal acquisition
under certain circumstances.” Id. at 98. “[I]conic signs and arbitrary signs are learned
with equal facility by children acquiring sign as a first language. [and] unlike early
gestures, are not necessarily tied to physical similarities in the world but represent true
linguistic symbols at a stage of development prior to spoken words.” Id. at 107.
Marschark concludes, “The sequence of emerging semantic relations in deaf children’s
language production parallels that observed in hearing children, at least when manual
deaf children are evaluated using sign language.” Id. at 126.
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inferences are ubiquitous in human thought, particularly when
we understand language.42
A. The Brain: A Symphony in Three Movements
The most widely accepted theory of the brain’s evolutionary
development of functional specialization, first proposed by Paul D. Mac
Lean, former director of the Laboratory of the Brain and Behavior at the
U.S. National Institutes of Health, is that we have developed, over time,
three discrete, though interconnected, areas of the brain.43 These areas
are frequently referred to as the “R complex” or “reptilian” brain, the
limbic system, and the neocortex.44
The reptilian brain is the most primitive part of the brain. Located
in the brain stem, it is primarily involved with physical survival and
operation of the “system” which is the body. It controls food processing
(eating and eliminating), systems operation (heart, lungs, liver, etc.),
reproduction, establishing and maintaining home territory
(territoriality), various “group” behaviors, and execution of the flightor-fight response.45 Overall, R-complex behaviors are “automatic, have
a ritualistic quality and are highly resistant to change.”46
The limbic system is primarily involved with the emotional system,
with evaluating, organizing, and directing incoming data for processing
in the brain stem and the cortex, and with our awareness of ourselves,
physically and emotionally. It is the focus of the creation of memories
developed in the context of active living. Contextual memories are a
composite of our inner and outer worlds—our history of emotional and
perceptual experiences, and new information constantly arriving
through our ongoing perceptions and experiences.47
The limbic system is also involved with certain of our primal
activities such as sense of smell, sex, nourishment, and bonding between

42.
43.

STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 334 (Penguin Press 1997).
Paul D. Mac Lean, A Mind of Three Minds: Educating the Triune Brain, in
EDUCATION AND THE BRAIN, 308-342 (Jeanne S. Chall & Allan F. Mirsky, eds., 1978)
(discussing the three parts of the brain—the “triune” brain—and how although it has
expanded in size, the brain has retained the basic features that reflect human’s
descendency from reptiles, early mammals, and recent mammals).
44. Id., see also RENATE NUMMELA CAINE & GEOFFREY CAINE, MAKING
CONNECTIONS: TEACHING AND THE HUMAN BRAIN, 58 (Pearson Learning 1994).
45. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 59-61.
46. Id. at 59.
47. Id. at 62.

660

QLR

[Vol. 23:643

individuals.48 It is capable of mediating our responses to external data
through its ability to “read” and act upon our emotional responses, as
well as overriding rational thought. Because the limbic system is
involved in all of these activities, emotion is involved with virtually
everything that we experience or do. For example, when incoming data
indicates a problem, and the limbic system in concert with our
rational/emotional brain structures, can discover no appropriate solution
or problem solving process, anxiety, even fear, takes over, and the brain
activates our fight-or-flight stress response.49 The limbic system is
powerful. “We tend to follow our emotions.”50
Finally, the neocortex, the outer portion of the brain, does most of
the processing of sensory data, and makes language, logical and formal
thinking, and planning for the future possible. It is responsible for the
creativity that we call science and art,51 and is largely responsible for
planning, analysis, sequencing, learning from errors, certain inhibitions
to inappropriate behaviors, and capacity for abstraction, including
empathy.52 Logical/rational thinking is centered in the neocortex.53
All three parts of the brain are in constant interaction. Although
one segment may be predominantly “in charge” at a given moment, the
others are not entirely out of the picture. This is especially true of the
limbic system because it is engaged in activities which are also part of
the function of the other two. For example, the limbic system’s receipt,
and direction of incoming data, relates to the perception and analysis of
external data by the neocortex, and is also essential as a trigger for the
response mechanism of the “reptilian” brain.
The challenge for legal educators is to help students learn so that,
when faced with problems, whether intellectual, moral or both, they
48. ROBERT SYLWESTER, A CELEBRATION OF
THE HUMAN BRAIN, 43-44 (Zephyr Press 1995).

NEURONS: AN EDUCATOR’S GUIDE TO

49. Id. at 45.
50. Id. at 44. See also, Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A
Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 814 (2001)
(arguing that moral judgment “is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations”);
Joshua D. Greene, et al., An MRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCI. 2105 (2001) (arguing that based on their experiments, the degree to
which emotion is engaged in influencing moral judgment varies with the kind of moral
dilemma presented). See discussion supra pp. 657-58; THOMAS LEWIS, ET AL., A
GENERAL THEORY OF LOVE, 112-118 (Vintage Books 2001); see also discussion infra
pp. 671, 676-77, of LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Temple University Press 1991).
51. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 63.
52. Id. at 67.
53. Id.
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avoid resorting solely to the automatic, primitive, flight or fight
response, but rather engage their neocortex with all of its power to
process sensory data, draw broadly from memory, abstract, identify
patterns, analyze rationally, and create new concepts, thus bringing to
consciousness a broad range of potentially effective, ethical responses.
In the following sections I will argue that the keys to the ability to learn
so that learning is usable for effective problem solving and ethical
lawyering are (a) the brain’s neural network system for recording
implicit experience in memory and later recalling it, (b) the emotional
power of the limbic system, and (c) their interaction.
B. Creating Memory: Connectivity and our Neural Network System

1.

Encoding the Brain—The Process of Transforming Sensory
Perception and Feeling into Memory

In a very real sense, we are our memories because it is from our
memories alone that we have a conception of who we are. We can have
that conception only as it relates to the environment in which we exist.54
How our ongoing experience of the environment is recorded, stored, and
recalled is what memory is all about. The stimulation of our sense
organs and our emotions causes electrical impulses to be transmitted to
nerves which connect the sense receptors to the brain, where they are
encoded. Memory is the result of the process by which the electrical
impulses caused by sense and emotional stimulation are recorded in the
brain.55 The physiological key to those processes are the neurons and
their interactions with each other throughout the brain. “[T]he content
of brain activity lies in the patterns of connections and activity among
the neurons.”56 Because we are always in some context and the brain is
always receiving sensory signals and recording them, the brain is always
learning and changing.57
Our neural networks build on existing patterns.58 When new data
comes into memory, it seeks connections with similar content
54.

DANIEL L. SCHACTER, SEARCHING FOR MEMORY: THE BRAIN, THE MIND, AND
40-42 (Basic Books 1996).
55. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 103; SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 98-100;
CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 30-31; PINKER, supra note 42, at 25-26.
56. PINKER, supra note 42, at 25.
57. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 31.
58. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 128-29; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 61.
THE PAST,
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previously recorded.59 The more we repeat experiences that create the
same or similar patterns of neural connection, the stronger the pattern
becomes, and the more likely we are to trigger its recall later.60
This system of creating memory through the patterns of
connections among neurons, and the tendency of repetition to strengthen
the pattern and its likely recall, gives rise to several powerful tools,
including the ability to correct errors in the perceived data, to
conceptualize, and to create meaning from discordant data.
a. Error Correction
When I send an email to my wife at Temple Law School and
inadvertently omit the “u” from the last segment of her address, the
email invariably returns as undeliverable. If the process were run
through my brain, however, it would recognize that I was aiming for
“temple.edu”—not “temple.ed”—and make the correction.61
b. Conceptualization
As the brain records similar patterns over time, the common
elements of those patterns are strengthened, while the uncommon
elements become weaker, and less likely to be recalled. The result is the
extraction, or creation, of a pattern that represents the core set of
connections, the prototype or underlying concept common to the various
inputs.62
c. Creating Meaning from Apparently Discordant Data
Frequently, there may be two possible interpretations from the
same sense data. In such cases the brain is capable of comparing the

59. PINKER, supra note 42, at 108-10 (pointing out that we learn from examples
where learning consists of increasing the “weight” of the connections between and
among the memories of related inputs, what he calls a “pattern associator.”).
60. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 132-38. Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 162-64
(“We often approach people and events with prior expectencies. . . .Your expectencies
may determine the very meaning you ascribe to . . . behaviors as you observe them.
Events that are congruent with our expectations may be particularly memorable not only
because we pay greater attention to them, but also because they are more strongly
related to our existing beliefs.” ).
61. See id. at 136-38 for a more detailed discussion of how the brain performs this
operation.
62. Id. at 111, 128-32, 135, 136-38; PINKER, supra note 42, at 108-10.
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input data to context and searching among similar patterns of neural
connections in order to select the best “fit.” Steven Pinker gives the
example of hearing someone say what sounds like “I am going to sinned
a pin.”63 The brain could take those sounds and seek their meaning
from memory exactly as they were heard. However, in the process of
trying to locate a pattern that matched the sound and meaning it would
likely find no match. Rather than merely reporting back “does not
compute,” as it might if the words heard were in a language that the
listener knew she didn’t understand, the brain will try to figure out what
does make sense by finding a pattern of neural connections that best
satisfies all of the ambiguities at once. If the listener’s memory has
recorded that the speaker is one who speaks with a decided southern or
southwestern accent and what that means her brain will determine
whether that pattern fits both the sound and contextually meaningful
interpretation. Even, however, if the listener does not know the
speaker’s dialect, she knows that a single speaker uttered both of the
“in” vowel sounds. Her memory tells her that at a given time a single
speaker usually attaches the same vowel sound to the same vowel. Thus
it is more likely than not that both of the sounds represent the same
letter. Her brain will then try out the available vowels, a, e, o, and u,
and discover that the only vowel that satisfies the constraints of being
similarly sounded and making sense in the context is “e.” At that point,
the listener’s memory will record that the speaker said, “I am going to
send a pen.”64
In Pinker’s example, the critical work of the brain was finding
patterns in the memory that most closely matched the pattern coming
from the sensory perceptions, knowledge of the speaker, and the
meaning created by the context of what was said. That required the
brain to remember not only the specifics, such as how different vowels
sound, but also to store myriad facts about the way the world operates,
such as that most people give the same vowel the same sound, native
speaking people from the southeastern and southwestern states
frequently speak with a particular dialect, and that the “e” and “i”
sounds are frequently the same in that dialect. All of this data is in our
memory even though we never consciously studied it, and the process
operates far below our level of conscious awareness.
And it all happened below our consciousness, and so quickly that
we are not aware of the process.
63.
64.

PINKER, supra note 42, at 105.
Id. at 106.
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In solving the problem of discordant data, the brain will, as we
have seen, be substantially influenced by our expectations and needs.65
2. Explicit and Implicit Memory
a. Explicit Memory
Certain memories, referred to as “explicit,” or “taxon,” memory,
result from intentional learning. Because the material was explicitly
studied as a unique focus of creating a memory of itself, rather than as
part of a broader experiential context, its memory involves only a few of
one’s senses and exists with minimal connection to other memories.66
Learning the directions from point “A” to point “B” written out for you
by a friend, or learning how to take apart and re-assemble your rifle, is
done explicitly. Acquiring such memories usually requires repetition,
and may also be assisted by observation of experts and continual
feedback.
Such memories include automatic skill sequences.
Memorization of the multiplication tables, the steps to turn on my
computer or car, touch typing, taking apart and re-assembling one’s rifle
in the dark, and specific athletic skills are types of taxon memory.
Memory acquired by explicit learning moves easily between memory
and conscious activation. Taxon memories are thus valuable in survival
situations because when triggered by the suggestion of danger, the skills
and memories laid down in that system of memory can quickly be called
into play, and we can expect the learned standard response even without
conscious prompting.67
b. Implicit Memory
In contrast, memory that develops from our participation in our
environment and comes to us through a wider variety of sensory
receptors is referred to as “implicit,” “locale,” or “map” memory.68 It is
referred to as “locale” or “map,” because it embeds into memory not

65. See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 162-64 (demonstrating how our emotional
states of needs/desire/motivation, and expectation affect the memory we create from the
data we perceive); see also, discussion infra, pp. 669-78.
66. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 42-44; see SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 170
for a demonstration of this with amnesic patients.
67. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 95-96.
68. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 44-47.
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only the specific data to be “learned,” but also the context, or locale, in
which we experienced it. It is “implicit” because it arises out of our
participation in our environment, without regard to our conscious
intention to remember it, and relates to ongoing aspects of our lives.69
Since our engagement with our environment is continuous, it is related
to, and builds upon, knowledge that already exists in memory.70
Implicit memory develops from the ongoing effort of the brain to create
patterns and relationships and to create meaning.71 It does not require
repetition or memorization.
The neural network system for creating memory is constantly
recording the context in which we move and experience life. Learning
that takes place implicitly is recorded as part of the entire contextual
pattern, and thus has multiple sensory inputs and myriad neural
connections. Each new pattern of connections contributes to the brain’s
memory of the event.72 Therefore, the more perceptual and emotional
inputs that create the neural pattern for a memory, the more connections
are created among the neurons. The more points of connection in a
pattern of memory, the more likely that a particular stimulus will bring
it to recall. 73
3. Social Intuitions
Just as all of us are born with the neural tools to learn language
implicitly, we are also born with the neural tools to develop values.
During our lives we are immersed in the “beliefs, values, sanctions,
rules, motives and satisfactions” of our particular communities.74 When
we are hungry or uncomfortable as infants, at home, at school and play,
the family mealtime, observing our parents interactions with each other,
69.

Id. at 46; SYLWESTER, supra note 48 at 95-98; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 42-

45.
70. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 46; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 44-46.
71. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 46.
72. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 58-59.
73. Id. at 42-46, 71; see also CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 48-49.
74. HAIDT—THE EMOTIONAL DOG, supra note 50, at 847 (arguing that moral
judgment “is generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations”), quoting J. W. M.
WHITING & IRVIN L. CHILD, CHILD TRAINING AND PERSONALITY: A CROSS CULTURAL
STUDY 27 (1953). See also John Dewey, Experience & Education, The Kappa Delta Pi
Lecture Series, 48 (1938, Touchstone ed. 1997) (“Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical
fallacies is the notion that a person learns only the particular he is studying at the time.
Collateral learning in the way of formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes,
may be and often is much more important than the spelling, or geography or history
lesson that is learned. For these attitudes are fundamentally what count in the future.”
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and with third parties, indeed on a continuing and ongoing basis from
birth on, we learn about relationships and values. Even without explicit
lessons in morals and customs, we pay close attention to what we
perceive them to be in our families, peer groups, etc., learning them
implicitly, because failure to abide by them will have serious adverse
consequences to us. Peer socialization contributes heavily to the shaping
of these moral intuitions.75 There is strong evidence that the brain’s
“hard wiring” for these moral values, develops during late childhood
through adolescence.76 We learn these values without ever having
explicitly studied them, and without consciousness of having learned
them.77 Among the earliest lessons that we learn relate to seeking
approval from, and obeying, those in positions of authority, those who
hold the key to our survival, comfort, and success or failure, and notions
of right and wrong. There are a variety of theories about exactly how
these lessons are learned, the relationship between cognitive and
emotional responses to environmental stimuli in forming the child’s
values in these areas, and their evolution through childhood.78 Yet no
75.
Id. at 828.
76.
Id. at 827-28.
77.
Haidt’s basic analysis is not new. For example, Lawrence Kohlberg (Stages
and Sequence, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Socialization, 347, 365-68, in
D.A. Goslin, ed., HANDBOOK OF SOCIALIZATION THEORY and RESEARCH
(Chicago, Rand McNally 1969)), and Carol Gilligan (IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
Psychological Theory of Women’s Development, Ch. 2, at 24-63 (Harvard University
press, 1982)), while disagreeing about the nature and extent of the development of
values and moral reasoning nevertheless agree that the process begins in childhood with
implicit learning from the people closest to us. And Robert Coles demonstrates
conclusively that moral development is certainly an active process in children from a
very young age. Thus, we arrive at adulthood with implicitly learned, socially
constructed “intuitions” concerning most aspects of moral values which form the basis
of our adult moral reasoning—the “Social Intuitionist” model of moral reasoning. Even
those who take issue with the power of Haidt’s social intuitionist model of moral
decision making in adulthood, and the ability of learned cognitive behavior to overcome
our social intuitions, agree that the process of developing the powerful, deeply imbedded
values which form the foundation for our moral reasoning as adults proceeds through
implicit childhood and adolescent learning. See, e.g., D.A. Pizarro and P. Bloom, The
Intelligence of the Moral Intuitions: A Reply to Haidt, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 193 (2003).
Haidt, however, counters by arguing that while the cognitive processes identified by
Pizarro and Bloom can be deployed, they very seldom are; leaving our social intuitions
to control our moral decision making. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog Does Learn
New Tricks: A Reply to Pizarro and Bloom, 110 PSYCHOL. REV. 197 (2003) (Hereinafter
Haidt – New Tricks.).
78
See, e.g., Marta Lupa, Elliot Turiel, and Philip A. Cowan, Obedience to
Authority in Children and Adults, in Melanie Killen and Daniel Hart, eds., MORALITY IN
EVERYDAY LIFE, Developmental Perspectives 131 (Cambridge University Press
(1999)(reviewing various theories in developmental psychology, concluding that at least
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authority suggests that early childhood learning is not relevant to the
values and moral behavior of the adult.
4. Some Limitations of Implicit Memory
At the same time, however, implicit memory has its limitations. For
example, the automatic error correction makes it very difficult for us to
proof read our own writing, because our brains have, over time,
developed strong patterns for perceiving and understanding the correct
spellings, and, upon seeing a slightly incorrect one are likely to recall
what we are actually seeing as the correct version.79 We bring to every
problem a host of intuitions, beliefs, and assumptions. These are
concepts that we have built on implicit memory accumulated over the
years, and we seldom, if ever, reconsider them without some strong
external impetus. When the patterns of memory we draw on to create
meaning from discordant data are implicit memory we are not conscious
of the analytical work that our brains are doing. Our tendency to
establish meanings, to draw conclusions, i.e., to conceptualize, from
implicit memory, and thereafter to make judgments based on those
concepts leads us to act without the application of critical judgment.80
“Implicit memory warps our window on the world.”81 “While
explicit memory serves itself up for conscious reflection, implicit
memory does not. That is why it escapes our notice.”82 “[We] acquire
wonderfully complicated knowledge that we cannot describe, explain,
or recognize.”83 “The brain never permits naked reality to intrude into
consciousness; all inbound sensory impressions pass through a process
that sands the rough edges off an inhospitably complex universe.”84
“All experience comes to us through similar layers of invisible and
occasionally dubious deductions. Our internal realities are mock-ups of
unparalleled persuasive power.”85 “Behind the bright, analytic engine
three factors affect children’s likelihood of obeying authority despite the authority’s
direction to act contrary to the child’s personal moral standard: (1) the proximity of the
actor to the experience of harm to the victim (both physical proximity and likelihood of
harm), (2) the legitimacy of the authority in terms of social context and knowledge,
(3)the authority’s ability to inflict punishment on the actor.)
79. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 138-39.
80. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 170-71.
81. LEWIS ET. AL., supra note 50, at 118.
82. Id. at 107.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 118-119.
85. LEWIS ET. AL., supra note 50, at 119.
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of consciousness is a shadow of silent strength, spinning dazzlingly
complicated life into automatic actions, convictions without intellect,
and hunches whose reasons follow later or not at all.”86 Implicit
memory has been shown, for example, to contribute to gender and racial
biases that people are unaware that they possess.87
5. Emotion: The Foundation on which we Build Memory
88

We don’t see things as they are. We see things as we are.

a. “[E]motionally important contexts can create powerful memories.” 89
The brain registers events as pleasurable or painful, exciting or
soothing.90 The story and context relating to our experience necessarily
involve emotion. While some particular emotional “highs” or “lows” are
explicitly recorded in memory, most emotional learning is implicit.91
All of our experiences involve our emotions. Thus our emotions are a
critical part of the neural patterns that comprise the memory of any
event. Indeed, some researchers have argued that there can be no
memory without emotional content.92

86. Id. at 112. See also, Haidt, supra note 50; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 50.
87. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 189-90. Geoffrey Hazard’s concern that the
failure to teach ethics throughout the law school curriculum sends the implicit message
lack of focus on ethical practice and professional responsibility is not a problem,
HAZARD, supra note 37, and Howard Lesnick’s concern that the selection of subject
matter in law school courses teaches a powerful implicit lesson that the matters not
included are unimportant. Howard Lesnick, Infinity In A Grain Of Sand: The World Of
Lawyering As Portrayed In The Clinical Teaching Implicit In Law School, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 1157 (1990), are but two examples of concern voiced by leading legal academics
for the powerful and potentially pernicious effect of implicit learning.
88. I have often seen this quote attributed to Anais Nin, and on occasion to the
Talmud, but never with any specific textual location.
89. Sylwester, supra, note 48; at 96; see also Schacter, supra note 54, at 201, 209
(noting the power of memories concerning personal trauma); Caine and Caine, supra
note 44, at 45-47 (discussing how emotions influence map formation in the brain)...
90. Pinker, supra note 42, at 139.
91. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 116.
92. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 63-64; See also C. Holden, Paul Mac Lean
and the Triune Brain, 204 SCI. 1066, 1069 (observing that “[a]ccording to Mac Lean,
subjectively ‘something doesn’t exist unless it’s tied up with emotion’.”).
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Emotion drives attention,93 and to the extent that attention to the
experience is an aid in creating memory, emotion is a major
contributing factor. That which is meaningful to the rememberer will be
more readily remembered than what is not.94 Our state of mind at the
time that we experience events affects what we remember.
Expectations95 and motivation96 are particularly important factors in
determining what we store in memory.
b.

Believing is Seeing97: Expectations and Motivation Guide Our
Perceptions and Memory

I used to teach my clinic and trial advocacy students that “fact”
witnesses can only testify about what they actually see, hear, smell,
taste, touch, and otherwise perceive with their senses. Now I teach them
that fact witnesses can testify only about what they “think their senses
perceive.” Our emotions affect not only what events we remember, but
also how we remember what our senses have experienced.
Expectations98 and motivation99 are particularly important factors in
determining what we store in memory.

93. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 72. At the same time, however, as discussed
below at pp. 674-75, 78-79, powerful, negative emotion may cause the brain to narrow
its focus and thus not give attention to relevant stimuli in the environment.
94. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 44-45. But see, discussion of “downshifting,” pp.
678-79, infra.
95. See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 162 (“Your expectations may determine
the very meaning you ascribe to [events as] you observe them, especially if they are
ambiguous and can be understood in more than one way.... Even when events have clear
meaning and are not open to multiple construals, our expectations can still influence our
meaning by directing the amount of attention we devote to different aspects of reality as
we observe it, and by determining how new information is linked to existing
knowledge).
96. Id. at 168-70 (Motivation affects the nature and amount of attention we pay to
what we perceive. The way we process an event and its resulting memorability are also
affected by the personal significance the event carries for us).
97. Thanks to Ian Weinstein, who introduced me to that felicitous phrase.
98. See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 162 (“Your expectations may determine
the very meaning you ascribe to [events as] you observe them, especially if they are
ambiguous and can be understood in more than one way.... Even when events have clear
meaning and are not open to multiple construals, our expectations can still influence our
meaning by directing the amount of attention we devote to different aspects of reality as
we observe it, and by determining how new information is linked to existing
knowledge”).
99.
Id. at 168-70 (Motivation affects the nature and amount of attention we pay to
what we perceive. “The way we process an event and its resulting memorability are also
affected by the personal significance the event carries for us”).
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c. Expectations, Perceptions, and Memory.
Expectations can arise from many sources, such as prior
experiences, information given by another person, stereotypes, etc. One
example of the power of expectations in creating memory is found in a
study in which two groups of individuals were shown a video of a
husband and wife interacting together. The difference between the two
groups was that one group was told that the woman was a librarian,
while the other was told that she was a waitress. Some of the activities
and attributes of the woman were consistent with stereotypes of
waitresses (e.g., drinks beer, affectionate with husband), and some with
those of librarians. (E.g., wears glasses, listens to classical music) When
the observers were questioned after viewing the video, they recalled the
attributes consistent with the stereotype of the person that they expected
to see, while not recalling the attributes that were more similar to the
other.100
d. Motivation, Perceptions, and Memory.
An example of a study that demonstrates the power of motivation
in affecting our perceptions involved second year students at a religious
seminary who were told that they had to give a practice sermon on the
topic of The Good Samaritan. Immediately before the time scheduled
for their assignment they were required to be across the campus from
the location at which they were to deliver their sermon. Some of the
students were told that they had plenty of time to get across the campus
and still be on time, while others were told that they were running late,
and needed to hurry in order to get to their assigned location on time.
Along the way, each passed by a person slumped in a doorway, looking
disheveled. Overwhelmingly, those that thought that they had plenty of
time, stopped to see if they could help the person, while those who
thought that they were late, did not. Later, when questioned about what
they had seen, those that felt that they had adequate time, described the
person as appearing to be in distress; while those that thought that they
were running late, and did not stop, described the person in terms of
appearing to be drunk, or on drugs.101

100. See ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 164.
101. John Darley and Daniel Batson, From Jerusalem to Jericho: A Study of
Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY AND
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 100 (1973).
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C. Responding Responsibly as Lawyers: Using the Tools Stored in
Memory to Make Behavioral Choices.
The myriad patterns of neural connections that make up our
memory, and to which we are constantly adding, thankfully remain
dormant until some stimulus or cue calls them to our consciousness.
Our challenge is to make the greatest use of our explicit and implicit
memories and the creative power of our neo-cortex, to solve the difficult
problems that challenge us to act in an ethically and professionally
responsible way, while effectively serving our clients.
1. The Power of Emotion in Problem Solving
In The Person and the Situation,102 Lee Ross and Richard E.
Nisbett collected the results of more than a dozen studies extending over
more than twenty years by a wide array of researchers, to demonstrate
that individuals make critical moral and personal decisions based on
their emotional reaction to factors that appear to be inherent in the
situation facing them, rather than on the individual’s previously
demonstrated moral and analytical qualities.103 The vast disparity
between actual and expected behavior strongly suggests that factors
other than expressed moral values and analytical ability are driving the
individuals’ decisions.
a.

The Power of Implicit Emotional Memory; Herein of Social
Intuitions and “Hot Cognition.”

Recent work, by researchers at Princeton University and the
University of Pittsburgh104 and by Jonathan Haidt at the University of
Virginia,105 supports the proposition that emotions may be even more
powerful than reasoning in making moral decisions. In addition,
psychiatrists Lewis, Amini, and Lannon, have drawn a similar
conclusion from their own clinical experiences and a review of much of
the research in the area.106 Cognitive psychologists refer to this process
102. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 50.
103. Id.
104. Greene, et al., supra note 50.
105. Haidt, supra note 50.
106. See LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 106-20 (demonstrating how patients with
implicit memory brain damage can still learn, but lose incremental acquisition of
intuitive knowledge).
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as “hot cognition,” which is the exercise of judgment that appears to be
the result of our cognitive, analytical, processes, but is, in fact, driven by
our emotions.107 Moreover, there is now a broad consensus that the
impact of past experiences, even those of which we are not conscious,
or were never conscious, can have great power in directing our present
perceptions, judgments, feelings, and behaviors.108 “We may
automatically infer people’s character from their behavior,
automatically experience affective reactions to a variety of objects,
automatically behave in line with traits cued by recent experiences, and
automatically engage in a variety of other mental processes as well.”109
Importantly, we are unaware of the operation of this process.
Researchers at Princeton University and the University of
Pittsburgh performed functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)
studies on subjects given three different problems to solve: one with no
moral dilemmas and two with the moral dilemma of whether it is
morally acceptable to affect the death of one person in order to save
five.110 The foundation for the latter two were what are known as the
“trolley dilemma”: a trolley is proceeding out of control down a track
towards five people who will certainly be killed if the trolley is not
stopped or derailed, but to stop or derail the trolley will necessarily
cause the death of one person.111
In the first of the two trolley situations, the subject is asked if he
would throw the switch to shift the trolley to another track which would
necessarily lead to the killing of one person who is standing on that
track. In the second situation, referred to as the “footbridge dilemma,”
there is no switch; however, there is a very large man standing at the
edge of the footbridge, under which the runaway trolley will pass before
striking and killing the five victims. If the subject pushes the man off
the bridge into the path of the oncoming trolley, the man will be killed,
but the impact will derail the trolley, saving the lives of the five persons
who would have otherwise been killed. The subject is asked whether he
would push the man.

107. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 211 (“Both motivation and affect may
influence which concepts, beliefs, and rules we apply to judgment; we may be especially
likely to apply those that are congruent with our goals and moods. Motivation may also
influence our mode of processing information, determining whether we rely on quick
and easy inferential shortcuts, or rely on elaborate systematic reasoning.”).
108. Id. at 265-88.
109. Id. at 303.
110. Greene et al., supra note 50, at 2105.
111. See id.
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Overwhelmingly, subjects said that they would throw the switch in
the first case, but not push the man in the second.112 When asked to
explain why, they were not able to do so based on any logical
reasoning.113 Rather, it “felt” or “seemed” different. During the
experiment, the fMRI recorded very different brain activity in the two
trolley situations. The brain activity during “the switch” was much
closer to that when the subject was considering the non-moral problem
than it was to the brain acting on the “footbridge” version. The
difference was seen as the actor’s emotional connection with the act of
actually pushing another to his death, as compared with the more
impersonal, and thus less emotional, act of causing his death through the
use of an intervening force, the trolley switch.114 Clearly, these
responses demonstrate the “automatic processes” described by
Kunda.115
“Intuitions within culturally supported ethics become sharper and
more chronically accessible, whereas intuitions within unsupported
ethics become weaker and less accessible.”116 Haidt does not deny that
moral thinking and reasoning, and reflective judgment, can be taught,
nor that once taught, they have no impact on one’s moral judgments and
action. Rather, he points to earlier demonstrations that “attempts to
directly teach thinking and reasoning in a classroom setting generally
show little transfer to activities outside the classroom, and because
moral judgment involves [more highly emotionally charged] topics than
are usually dealt with in courses that attempt to teach thinking and
reasoning, the degree of transfer is likely to be even smaller.”117 Haidt’s
argument is supported by subsequent work done by Joshua Greene and
Haidt which concluded, “Neuroimaging studies of moral judgment in
normal adults, as well as studies of individuals exhibiting aberrant
behavior, all point to the conclusion, embraced by the social intuitionist
model, that emotion is a significant driving force in moral judgment.
These results also suggest that much, although not necessarily all, moral
judgment makes use of processes [in the brain] specifically dedicated to

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id. at 2106.
Greene et al., supra note 50, at 2105-08.
See supra note 107, and accompanying text.
Haidt, supra note 50, at 827.
Id. at 829.
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social cognition and, more specifically, the representation of others’
mental states.”118
b. Cognitive Dissonance
All of us like to feel good about ourselves and the institutions with
which we identify. Thus, it is natural that we perceive our behaviors as
being consistent with our values.119 Under certain conditions,
discrepancies between what actions we take and our attitudes toward
those actions can induce a state of tension. According to Leon Festinger,
our inclination to reduce this tension, or cognitive dissonance, can
sometimes cause us to act irrationally.120 We are well-versed in
dissonance behavior; anytime we make a tough decision we tend to
rationalize it by underscoring the pros of our decision and overstating
the cons of the action we chose not to take.121
In a 1959 study by Festinger and J. Merrill Carlsmith, subjects
were made to perform an extremely mundane task, as part of an
“experiment.” Subjects were then offered compensation, either $1 or
$20, to tell the next participant (who was actually a confederate) that the
task was enjoyable. Afterward the participants were asked how they felt
about the tasks. Those who did not deceive the confederate judged the
tasks as boring, as did those who received $20 for the deception.
However, those paid only a dollar to mislead the next participant ranked
the tasks as somewhat enjoyable. While members of the $20 group were
sufficiently justified in their actions, those in the $1 (a very small
reward) group were not, and so changed their attitude to reduce
dissonance. 122
In a similar study, children were threatened with either a mild or
severe punishment to keep from playing with an appealing toy. While
all subjects desisted, those threatened severely did not change their
attitude toward the toy, while those threatened only mildly proceeded to

118. JOSHUA GREENE AND JONATHAN HAIDT, HOW (AND WHERE) DOES MORAL
JUDGMENT WORK?, TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE, 2002 at 517, 522.
119. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 218-23 (reviewing the consistent research that
supports the conclusion that motivation to believe that one is a good person drives
changes in behavior and attitude about one’s behavior).
120. See Leon Festinger, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, (Stanford
University Press, 1957); Sharon S. Brehm, Steven Fein, and Saul M. Kassin, SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 206 (5th ed., Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002).
121. Brehm, et al, supra note 120, at 209.
122. Id. at 206-08.
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disregard the toy later. In fact, the milder the threat, the more one’s
attitude tended to change.123
Claude Steele and his colleagues studied the possibility that the
characteristic attitude changes associated with cognitive dissonance
stem from a motivation to obtain self-affirmation following the
challenge to one’s self-image when one engages in counter-attitudinal
behavior.124 If the behavior is seen in a more favorable light, the person
can reaffirm their sense of self as a respectable and intelligent person,
hence the attitude change. One study involved participants who either
did or did not care about politics and economics. Though all of the
students were opposed to increases in tuition, they were asked to
support considerable tuition hikes in an essay. Before they were asked
about their attitudes, however, the students were asked to fill out a
questionnaire about politics and economics. For those who appreciated
politics and economics, the questionnaire provided self-affirmation by
reminding them of an esteemed aspect of themselves, eliminating a need
for attitude change. On the other hand, for participants not interested in
politics and economics the questionnaire provided no self-affirmation,
and these participants did, indeed, exhibit a corresponding change in
attitude.
Utilization of other means of self-affirmation during situations in
which we must engage in counter-attitudinal behavior, helps us to
maintain a consistent, rational, and positive view of our actions.
Attributing our actions to the need to be a “zealous advocate” for our
client, the supposed wisdom and experience of a superior, or simply the
belief that “It’s not my decision to make,” might present such
opportunities.

123. Id. at 208.
124. C.M. Steele and T.J. Liu, Dissonance Processes as Self Affirmation, 45
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 5 (1983); Kunda, supra, note 20, at 220-23.
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c. Situationism125
Among the studies on which Ross and Nisbett126 reported was
Stanley Milgram’s renowned series of experiments, in which he
demonstrated that given the right set of circumstances, otherwise good
people can be influenced to “perform actions that were callous and
severe.”127 Subjects of his experiment agreed to take part in a study
measuring learning techniques, and met the professor in charge of the
study, as well as a fellow participant (who, in reality, was a confederate
of the investigator). The two participants were “randomly” assigned
roles, the real subject assigned to play the “teacher,” and the confederate
assigned to play the “learner.” The professor would read one word from
an associated word pair, and if the learner did not provide the correct
word association, the teacher would have to give him a slight electric
shock by flipping a switch. However, with every wrong answer, the
intensity of the shock would increase by 15 volts; silence would be
treated as a wrong answer. There was no real electric shock; however,
the “learner” had been prepared to simulate receipt of a shock of the
degree that the “teacher” was told he was administering, including
screaming in pain, or begging not to go on because he or she suffered
from a weak heart, etc.128
While it was predicted from pre-experiment surveys of
comparable subjects, as well as of mental health professionals, that only
one out of a hundred people would administer a shock up to 450 volts where it was marked “DANGER: SEVERE SHOCK,” and by which
time the learner (confederate) would have protested, complained of
pain, screamed in agony, then become completely silent – 65% of
Milgram’s first pool of subjects went all the way to the maximum
shock. Milgram also found that the relative authority of the person in

125 For a comprehensive review of the principal research in situationism, and an
analysis of its application to a wide variety of historical and current events, see Jon
Hanson and David Yosifson, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational
Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U.PA. L. REV.
129, 149-79, 202-85 (2003) (arguing that much that passes for rational analysis in
economics and politics is, in fact, the result of responses to situations that we need to
make ourselves feel comfortable with automatic, emotionally based decisions that we
have already made subconsciously).
126 Supra note 50.
127 Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to
Authority, 18 HUM. REL. 57, 74-75 (1965); Stanley Milgram, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY
(1974).
128 Id.
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charge of the experiment (such as the professor, in the above case) was
directly correlated to the proportion of “teachers” who would dispense
the full 450 volts. Also, when one credible person in charge was
replaced by two such authorities, the percentage of “teachers” who fully
cooperated was obliterated.129
Dr. Philip Zimbardo of Stanford University, creator of the famous
1971 “Stanford Prison Experiment,”130 argues that each and every one
of us can be made to engage in behavior we would otherwise deem
ourselves incapable of—given the right circumstances. Zimbardo details
such circumstances, amongst which are a “cover story” under which the
objectionable behavior is justified; relatable roles for the subjects to
play (such as teacher/learner in Milgram’s experiment; prison
guard/prisoner in his own); some sort of obligation to carry out the
behavior; responsibility for any negative consequences diverted away
from the subject; and a gradual increase in the nature of the situation
from reasonable to perverse (including both the level of shock and the
authority of the professor in Milgram’s experiment).131
Zimbardo’s groundbreaking 1971 experiment illustrated the extent
to which extraordinary behavior can arise from a given situation. In his
study, participants with no prior experience or exposure to prisons, were
to take on the roles of guards or prisoners in a simulated prison
environment, set up in a campus class room building, for a period of two
weeks. Prisoners inhabited the setting at all times, while guards worked
8 hour shifts, but neither were taught how to perform their roles. What
transpired was beyond anyone’s expectations—normal young men
acting as guards began to aggressively torment and humiliate those
acting as prisoners, and many of the otherwise healthy students acting as
prisoners experienced severe stress and even breakdowns; the study had
to be terminated after a mere six days.132 Perhaps most telling was
Zimbardo’s own transformation into a harsh and uncaring Prison
Superintendent, unbeknownst to himself.133 The “Good Samaritan”
129. Id.
130. .See P.G. Zimbardo, C. Haney, C. Banks, and D. Jaffe, “The Mind is a
Formidable Jailer: A Piradellian Prison. The NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 38
(April 8, 1973); P.G. Zimbardo, C. Maslach, and C. Haney, REFLECTIONS ON THE
STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT: GENESIS, TRANSFORMATION, CONSEQUENCES, in T.
Blass (Ed.) OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: Current Perspectives on the Milgram Paradigm,
193 (Earlbaum Publishing, Mahwah, NJ 1999); available at www.prisonexp.org.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Philip G. Zimbardo, A Situationist Perspective on the Psychology of Evil:
Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators., in Arthur Miller
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experiment at Princeton Theological Seminary, discussed at p. 670,
supra, is yet another example of situationally driven moral reasoning.
And, I would argue, the “social contexts” that permeate large
corporations and the law firms that represent them, described by Mark
A. Sargent, which lead to his pessimistic view of the potential impact of
the SEC’s Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys,134 is an
archetypal example of situationism at work.
d. The Danger of “Downshifting”
Making choices and exercising judgment produces stress. Making
morally charged choices, or choices in situations where one feels
personally threatened, produces a high level of stress. The more
stressed we are the less likely we are to engage our cognitive processes,
and the more likely we are to rely, unthinkingly, on our expectations,
desires, and other emotion laden memories.135 Stress produces physical
and psychological reactions within our body.136 Among our reactions to
stress is the release of several hormones in the brain, including
adrenaline, noradrenalin, and cortisol.137 Increases in adrenaline and
noradrenalin in the brain are generally associated with stress perceived
as a challenge which we have the ability to meet, rather than as a threat.
It can strengthen us to handle the challenge.138 Such stress is not
particularly harmful to the body.139
However, under conditions of persistent or unreasonably high
stress, the body secretes excessive amounts of cortisol.140 High levels of
cortisol inhibit cognitive functioning, and can lead to the inability to
distinguish between important and unimportant elements of an
experience, or to feelings of despair.141 Thus, constant or unreasonably
(Ed.) THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL: UNDERSTANDING OUR CAPACITY
FOR KINDNESS AND CRUELTY, manuscript at 14-15 (New York, Guilford Publishing, in
press, 2004).
134. Mark A.Sargent, supra note 35
135. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 167.
136. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 70.
137. Id. at 71.
138. Id. at 72.
139. Id. at 70.
140. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 71.
141. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 38 (“Chronic high cortisol levels can lead to the
destruction of neurons in the hippocampus associated with learning and memory. Even
the short term stress-related elevation of cortisol in the hippocampus can lead to the
inability to distinguish between the important and the unimportant elements of a
memorable event.”); SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 243-44.
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high levels of stress can have very negative effects on learning.142 They
can impede our capacity to perceive patterns and form memories.143
When our brains perceive a situation as threatening and we do not feel
able to resolve it satisfactorily, we do what some psychologists have
called “downshifting,” to focus on the perceived threat.144 When we
“downshift” we narrow our focus and limit the incoming stimuli which
we consider in order to engage our more primitive self-protective
response mechanism.145
In such situations, the brain is also less able to engage in openended thinking and connect the perceived experience with the full array
of neural connections that might otherwise be available to us to
formulate a response. Rather than engage the neocortical brain with its
power to abstract, analogize, consider broader and more subtle external
and internal cues, and develop new connections and responses necessary
for resolving the threatening situation, we get “stuck.” At that point, the
brain’s problem solving mechanism may shut down. We feel helpless,
fatigued, even a sense of despair, and are unable to distinguish between
important and unimportant elements in the environment, or to access our
open-ended reasoning power. Our brain resorts to recall primarily from
its more primitive, survival oriented reptilian and limbic systems.146
Responding through those systems leaves us with limited tools: the
“relentless unreasoning force” of implicit emotional memory with
which to understand the situation,147 “automatic actions, convictions
without intellect, and hunches whose reasons follow later or not at
all”148 and fight-or-flight as our arsenal of responses. We become
defensive, even phobic, and tend to act precipitously. “When we
downshift, we revert to the tried and true, and follow old beliefs and
behaviors regardless of what information the road signs provide.”149
142. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 243-44 (“[T]this impairment [problem learning
and remembering fear] can be produced by damaging a single structure within the
amygdala, known as the lateral nucleus.”).
143. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 71.
144. Id. at 69-70.
145. Id.; see also SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 242-44 for a discussion of how a
prolonged stressful environment can have deleterious effects on the brain and cause
neuron loss.
146. SYLWESTER, supra note 48 at 38; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 73, 76-77;
SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 242-44.
147. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 118.
148. Id. at 112.
149. Id. at 70. For a further discussion of emotion, learning, and downshifting, see
SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 45 and 73; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 69-70; and
discussion supra pp. 659-60.
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e. Avoiding the Dangers of Downshifting
Zimbardo argues that while “‘a few bad apples may spoil the barrel
(filled with good fruit/people), a vinegar barrel will always transform
sweet cucumbers into sour pickles—regardless of the best intentions,
resilience, and genetic nature of those cucumbers.’ So does it make
more sense to spend resources to identify, isolate and destroy bad apples
or to understand how vinegar works, and teach cucumbers to avoid
undesirable vinegar barrels?”150 Unfortunately, lawyers cannot avoid the
pickle barrel. Every form and model of lawyering that I have seen
presents a virtual minefield of ethically challenging situations.
The good news, however, is that while situationally induced
automatic responses, “hot cognition,” and downshifting are driven by
powerful forces, they are not necessarily pre-ordained.151 For one thing,
if we have sufficient time to reflect on the situation, and our emotional
response to it, formulate potential solutions, and consider the
consequences of various possible courses of action, we may be able to
override the effects of automatic reactions.152 In addition, when our
emotions inform us that we care about making the right decision, the
emotional force of that motivation can overcome the tendency to act
automatically.153 Another critical factor in determining whether we
“downshift,” limiting our intake of data and the range of our responses,
or instead open ourselves to expand our data intake and deploy the
powerful analytical tools of the neo-cortex, appears to be “whether we
see a solution to [the] problem or perceive ourselves as capable of
resolving it.”154

150. Zimbardo, supra note 133, at 14-15.
151. See, e.g., Lewis, et al, supra note 50, at 169-90 (discussing the process by
which psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their implicitly learned, emotional
memories, and replace automatic responses with more reflective ones); Ziva Kunda,
supra note 20, at 289, 305.
152. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 289.
153. Id. at 305.
154. CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 72.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW SCHOOL
A. Traditional Law School Curriculum and Pedagogy Fail to Prepare
Students to Solve Value Laden Ethical Problems.
The environment in which law students are immersed is rich with
reading and interpreting statutes and court decisions, analyzing text,
considering the phrasing of an appropriate rule of law, and arguing for
its adoption against professors and colleagues. Students are constantly
engaged in analyzing the same type of material, deciding what the legal
rule should be, and zealously advocating in favor of its application.155
Socratic dialogue in our classes is emotionally charged, as students are
challenged to come up with arguments facing their professors,
surrounded by their peers. By implicit learning, i.e., by doing, and
being critiqued, rather than by intentionally studying the process, and by
repetition, students working in that atmosphere learn principles and
processes of analysis of statutes, regulations, and court opinions and
how to build an argument in support of the client’s position. Their
neural networks form patterns of implicit memory that are repeatedly
reinforced, to follow or distinguish precedent whenever they must
analyze legal problems. Because they work primarily from appellate
opinions, they are “programmed” to look to predetermined sources, e.g.,
the findings of the court below, the appellate court’s identification of the
relevant facts, or the professor’s hypothetical, for all of the relevant
facts. In addition, the emotion of both the Socratic dialogue in class and
exams have reinforced those implicit memories. They may forget most
of the particular legal doctrines learned in various substantive courses;
however, forever after, whenever their senses perceive a problem as a
legal problem, their brains will call on the patterns of neural
connections—the memories—that were created implicitly in law school,
about how to respond. Noticeably absent from the explicit teaching,
except in the course on ethics, is any consideration of values. When the
legal problem is instrumentalist—how to accomplish our client’s goal—
the explicit and implicit knowledge garnered in law school about how to
solve legal problems stands our students, as lawyers, in good stead,
because the answer involves making an effective argument for the
155. In each law school course, students analyze appellate opinions using
substantially the same tools and methods.
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applicability of a legal rule to achieve that goal. The difference between
the particular raw material presented by the client in “real life,” and the
“hypos” faced in law school, are not terribly problematic, because the
concepts and analytical skills that were so effectively encoded in
memory en route to the J.D. are readily transferable to most legal
domains. Drawing on those memories will, generally, produce valuable
information for solving instrumentalist legal problems. However, when
the problem is not how to do something, but rather whether to do it,
when it involves values or relationships among people—which much of
a lawyer’s work does—neither the explicit, nor the implicit knowledge
learned in law school is of much help. Among the factors that the rulebased examination of the problem does not consider are the future
relationships between and among the parties, the values of the relevant
players, including the lawyer, and the potential impact on third parties.
Relationships and values, however, implicate emotion as much, or more,
than cognitive analysis.
As we have seen, most of our moral choices are initiated
automatically, before our cognitive processes can be engaged, by the
values, social intuitions, expectations, and needs which we have
developed over many years of daily living and implicit, emotionally rich
learning. They are in place before students arrive at law school.
Moreover, the more stress we experience when confronted by a moral or
ethical dilemma, the more likely we are to simply rely on those
emotional memories, and the less likely we are to engage our cognitive
resources. The lawyers in the problems at the beginning of this paper
probably studied the rules of professional responsibility, yet they were
unable to overcome the pressures of the situations in which they found
themselves, even to the point of considering the ethical issues, and
developing an appropriate problem solving strategy. Nevertheless,
while our mental-emotional edifice, constructed over many years is
powerful, our pre-adult experiences are not necessarily our destiny.156
But it is not easy to change. Simply studying and learning moral
reasoning won’t do it.
After childhood, “emotional learning doesn’t stop, but it slows.
[O]ften the only emotional learning one sees after childhood is the
reinforcement of existing fundamentals.”157 Lewis et al suggest that
156. Id. at 829; LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 169-90 (discussing the process by
which psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their implicitly learned emotional
memories); ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 289, 305.
157. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50, at 163.
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three to five years, sometimes more, of therapy is usually required to
make significant change in adults’ emotional responses.158 Haidt
suggests “[y]ears of. . . .implicit learning, coupled with explicit
discussion, should gradually tune up intuitions. . . about justice, rights,
and fairness, leading perhaps to an automatic tendency to look at
problems from multiple perspectives. . . .”159 But he ventures no guess
as to how long that might take.
The legal education described by Friedland’s survey results,160 and
familiar to all of us, does not seem likely to serve those goals. Worse
yet, it may, as I think the examples at the beginning of this article
demonstrate, be antithetical to them.
For most law students, their exposure to matters of professional
responsibility is limited to taking one course in the subject, and in
preparing for and taking the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination (MPRE).161 Although the American Bar Association has,
since 1974, required as a condition of accreditation that a law school
require each of its graduates to complete a course in professional
responsibility,162 there is little incentive for students to really “dig into”
the subject, even at the rule-based level. 163
To the extent that the course is taught in a manner similar to that
used in other subject matter courses, the emotional experience of the
students is minimal.164 Certainly, there is always some emotional
connection when one is called upon in class, and with final exams. Yet,
158. Id. at 187.
159. Haidt, supra note 50, at 829; see also, Eleanor W. Myers, Simple Truths about
Moral Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 823, 835-36 (1996); Myers, supra note 37, at 40910, 414, 416-17.
160. Friedland, supra note 29, at 19-23, 27-30.
161. The career plans of our students do not incentivize them to pay particular
attention to issues of ethics and professional responsibility. In the more than ten years
that I have been teaching, during all of which time I have served on my law school’s
Career Planning and Placement Committee, and indeed in the twenty-five years that I
practiced before that, I have heard of only one law firm, during one hiring season, that
considered an applicant’s responses to questions of professional responsibility during
the hiring process, or paid particular attention to the applicant’s grade in that course.
162. ABA Standard 302(a) (iv), Standards for Approval of Law Schools.
163. Law schools have not rushed to adopt Professor Rhode’s proposed “pervasive
method” for educating law students about professional responsibility by including some
problem set and important class time for discussion of professional responsibility issues
throughout the curriculum. Rhode, supra note 16, at 4-5. Rather, professional
responsibility is generally a two credit course offered to second and third year students,
frequently after they have taken and passed, with the aid of a bar review course, the
MPRE.
164. For a discussion of Friedland’s findings see supra note 29.
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in class, and when the exam is comprised of the standard essay and/or
multiple choice questions, the student is required to identify and apply
the rule of professional conduct implicated in a given fact pattern. The
emotional connection is with knowing and applying the correct rule in a
situation in which the student knows, in advance, that the fact pattern
raises one or more ethical questions. Students’ emotional engagement is
not with seeking to discover and understand the full context, identifying
and creating options, discerning the ethical choice, and acting on it by
exercising judgment to decide what to do, and communicating that
judgment to a client and/or supervisor who might prefer a different
response, knowing that she may face adverse consequences from her
choices. Rather, the only thing at risk is the student’s grade in a course
she may see as having little impact on her future.
Legal problems encountered throughout the law school curriculum,
outside of Professional Responsibility class, are generally taken from
the instrumentalist perspective, and do not consider matters of
professional responsibility, i.e., they ask only how to do something.
Matters of professional responsibility are, inherently, normative, i.e.,
asking whether to do something. Thus, to the extent that our students
carry memories of issues relevant to ethical decision making, they are
primarily explicitly learned, “taxon” memories of specific rules learned
in their one class on ethics and professional responsibility.165

165. Of course, there have been numerous creative and potentially effective efforts
by talented and dedicated teachers of professional responsibility to design and teach
professional responsibility within a pedagogic framework that do exactly what Haidt,
Caine & Caine, Schoen, Blasi, and Myers, suggest, including engaging the students in
the process of exercising judgment in multiple contexts, and making visible their
reasoning process in a safe and supportive environment so that it can be carefully
analyzed, and re-examined in the light of thoughtful feedback. See sources cited supra
note 50. See also Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the
Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719 (1998) (urging that law
schools promote the importance of legal ethics by making it a required, three credit, first
year, first semester course and an upper level course, as well as incorporate ethics into
all other classes); Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39
WM. & M. L. REV. 357 (1998) (promoting the idea of teaching legal ethics from a
“contextual” standpoint rather than as a survey course as being more effective because it
emphasizes the importance of context when making decisions and gives students more
time to develop skills); Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. L.
ETHICS, 33 (1996) (advocating the need to develop the capacity to make well-reasoned,
ethical decisions in lawyers and the importance of teaching this to students beyond the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility); SYMPOSIUM, supra at note 35.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that, within the three years of law school, a single exposure
to professional responsibility in a two or three credit mandatory, upper level course,
often taught after the students have passed the MPRE, challenges even the very best of
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If we return to consider the problems which introduced this paper
in light of what cognitive science teaches us about learning and acting
we will see that they have several things in common:
1. Each of them was perceived as carrying significant risk to the
lawyer.
2. In each case the lawyer had neither practice addressing such
challenging problems, nor had they an apparently readily available
source of support for analyzing or addressing the problem.
3. Each lawyer “downshifted.” (a) They acted as if there was no
ethical issue to consider, despite their knowledge of the rules. Denial
and avoidance are clear examples of “flight.” (b) The problem solving
behavior they chose to employ is perfectly explainable in terms of the
“three principles” that were imbedded in their implicit memory in law
school. They acted automatically, reverting to the tried and true.166
If it is true that our reactions in the face of moral or ethical
questions are most significantly automatic, driven by social intuitions,
which are primarily governed by elaborately encoded, implied
emotional memories, 167 and if the legal academy is concerned about our
students’ performance as ethical lawyers, then law schools are faced
with a dilemma. On one hand, if students come to us with intuitions
that incline them to be reflective and responsible about moral and
ethical issues, to look at problems from multiple perspectives, to search,
and then to act consistently with the morally correct decision,168 we
want to reinforce them, and also give them the tools to enable them to
be both professionally responsible, and zealous and effective advocates
for their clients. On the other hand, if they come to the law school with
intuitions that do not incline them to consider issues of ethics and
professional responsibility, other than perhaps as traps to avoid, rather
teachers to really engage the students at an emotional level. C.f., Frenkel, supra note 37,
at 20-23 (arguing that although professional responsibility is the only required subject in
all law schools, it is difficult to teach because there is not a uniform format, duration or
teaching method, there is not always institutional support in the form of resources and
credit hours, and there is often a great deal of student resistance). Moreover, by limiting
the teaching of professional responsibility to the course in “Professional Responsibility,”
we run the risk of limiting our students’ ability to apply the principles and practices we
teach in that course to other contexts. See e.g., HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 139, at
62 (arguing that the ability to transfer knowledge from one situation to another depends
upon the context in which it is first learned).
166. See supra pp. 678-80.
167. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 189-90.
168. Haidt, supra note 50, at 829; LEWIS, ET AL., supra note 50, at 169-90
(discussing the process by which psychotherapy helps individuals re-order their
implicitly learned memories).
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than reinforcing those intuitions their legal education should seek to
enhance their sensitivity and responsiveness to the important role that
those issues play in our profession, while assuring them that to do so is
not to surrender their effectiveness as advocates for their clients. Law
schools should help them acquire the skills to pursue both goals
simultaneously, and the emotional strength to do so. That is, we should
strive to create new explicit and implicit emotional memory of being
ethically responsible, while exercising the skills necessary to effective
problem solving as advocates for their clients.
Motivation is the key to attitude change. Attitude change is driven
by the need to affirm oneself as a good person. Self affirmation can be
achieved by changing one’s attitude about one’s behavior—either
changing the behavior so that it comports with prior values, or changing
one’s values as they relate to the extant behaviors.169
As long as law schools teach students to value effective legal
arguments without regard to the moral and ethical consequences of their
actions, they will not be motivated to value embedding ethical and
moral considerations in their professional behavior as lawyers.
B. How Experts Solve Novel and Complex Problems
“Experts” are people who can understand and solve problems that
others—non-experts—cannot. Thus, it might be valuable in trying to
ascertain how to go about learning to solve complex ethical problems to
examine what it is about “expertise” that enables experts, generically, to
do so.
As described by Gary L. Blasi170 and Donald A. Schön,171 experts
seem to be able to leapfrog over several levels of detailed analysis to
identify and engage patterns of apparently related information directly
to a given problem, and also to matters that are facially different, yet
analogous, and thus useful for the solution. Their memories include a
combination of a deep body of subject matter data, and “experience,”
the accumulated knowledge from actually using the data in various
situations over time (i.e., in context). Accessing these memories
permits them to compare and contrast the characteristics of the
169. ZIVA KUNDA, supra note 20, at 218-23 (reviewing the consistent research that
supports the conclusion that motivation to believe that one is a good person drives
changes in behavior and attitude about one’s behavior).
170. Blasi, supra note 28.
171. DONALD A. SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS
THINK IN ACTION (Basic Books 1983).

2004]

TEACHING LAW STUDENTS TO BE ETHICAL

687

presenting problem with those of the many problems with which they
have engaged in the past. Schön describes this as engaging in a
“reflective conversation with a unique and uncertain situation.” 172 This
process enables the experts to construct patterns, or “mental models”
that permit them to move forward towards a solution. 173
Critical to the experts’ approach to a problem are the following: (1)
a deep foundation of factual knowledge in the domain; (2) experience,
i.e., working with the data in context; and (3) understanding of the
conceptual framework that relates to the domain. Given these attributes,
experts can see patterns in the data that might not be obvious to others
and thus recognize when a “given” problem actually has critical
unidentified attributes—perhaps even a different foundational
problem—that affect achievement of the desired goal.174
How is such expertise developed?
1. Elaborately Encoded, Implicit Memory
Explicit, or taxon, memory created by intentional studying of
relevant material is one factor. But, experts’ knowledge cannot be
reduced to a fund of explicitly learned data. Rather, it is implicitly
learned, contextualized, and organized around core concepts.175 For the
professionals whose work was examined by Schön, all of the problems
presented challenges that they had not directly encountered before.
However, they were able to engage the problem in context, and find
concepts from their experience that contributed to developing a solution.
In so doing, they continually re-examined and reflected on their
understanding of the problem, as well as the appropriateness of their
approach to solving it,176 each time elaborately encoding new patterns of
172. Id. at 130 (The expert responds to a situation in action based upon her
education, training and experience in using that knowledge in context. That action
produces consequences which may include unexpected ones (i.e., the situation “talks
back” to the expert), and the expert responds to that “back-talk.” The expert uses this
process to build towards a solution.).
173. Blasi, supra note 28, at 335-36, 344; SCHÖN, supra note 171, at 268-69; See
also, HOW PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE AND SCHOOL, 31-33 (John D.
Bransford, et. al eds., National Academy Press 2000).
174. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 45-47 (The “virtuoso” or expert with
adaptive expertise, treats the client’s articulation of the problem with respect, but also as
a point of departure for further exploration.).
175. Id. at 13, 36-38, 48.
176. SCHÖN, supra note 171, at 54-56 (examples of major league baseball pitcher,
and experienced jazz musician, both of whom must examine their performance as it
relates to the performance of others, and evaluate and adjust as they are performing),
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neural connections that reinforced the core relationships among the data.
Without a vast store of elaborately encoded, implicit knowledge, such
an approach would not have been possible. The creation of implicit
memory by repeated elaborate encodings from different, yet similar
contexts not only enhances the internal bond of the patterns of neural
connections, but also highlights the core similarities among related
neural patterns, thus strengthening the connections among those
representing the concepts central to the memory.177
2. Adaptive Expertise and Metacognition
Some experts simply possess large funds of domain knowledge but
are unable to apply it to matters outside of those areas. Chess masters,
for example, have been shown to have a keen ability to remember the
placement of pieces on the board far better than they can remember
similar non-chess related patterns.178 Other experts, such as those
studied by Schön, are able to adapt their knowledge to the demands of
new and different external situations. They are said to have “adaptive
expertise.”179
Experts with adaptive expertise see the presenting problem as the
starting point for exploration, an exploration that may lead to a
reconfiguration of the problem, itself, as well as the development of a
path leading to an effective solution.180 Key to the difference between
experts with and without adaptive expertise is metacognition.
Metacognition refers to the ability to understand one’s own thought

and 128-36 (reviewing the preceding discussion of that same process by architects and
psychotherapists).
177. See discussion “Implicit Memory,” supra pp. 665-66; SCHACTER, supra note
54 at 56, 60, 63 (recall of explicitly learned memory depends upon the similarity
between the encoding process and the recall cue; while elaborately encoded, or implicit,
memory, being susceptible to recall by myriad cues, has a much higher likelihood of
being recalled) Another example of the critical value of contextualized learning is that
actors don’t simply memorize lines, but rather seek to understand the person they are
portraying, and the emotional environment and impact on that person of the situation in
which they find themselves. SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 49. Pinker further explains
that access to long term memory—“access consciousness”—is a function of the
“richness of present-tense [i.e., sensory] awareness” attention and emotion at the time
of the experience, and relevance at the time of need for recall. Pinker, supra note 42, at
138-45.
178. Blasi, supra note 28, at 335; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 48-49.
179. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 46-48.
180. Id. at 32.
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processes,181 including the nature, scope, and limitations on one’s
knowledge, and the willingness to seek to overcome the limitations by
seeking out new sources of relevant expertise.182 To avoid such
automatic responses as downshifting, but instead employ the best of
one’s analytical and problem solving skills, including an objective
evaluation of one’s own resources, as well as their limitations, and then
seek out other resources necessary to create an effective solution,
requires motivation, competence and confidence.
IV. BUILDING BETTER LAWYERS THROUGH CONTEXTUALLY RICH,
EMOTIONALLY ENGAGED LEARNING183
A. What Would It Take?
In order to make the best use of their analytical abilities in the face
of ethically opaque situations, students need to be motivated to do so,
and to understand the historically developed “intuitions” that are
pushing or pulling them in particular directions. They need to have the
skills and confidence to engage in the type of analysis that encompasses
both values and traditional legal analysis, and the courage to make
professionally responsible choices in the face of conflicting values. And
they should learn how to seek and obtain support when they need to
work through problems freighted with ethical issues, as most
practitioners do.
To achieve those results, law faculty will need to construct a
learning environment specifically designed for that purpose.

181. SYLWESTER, supra note 48, at 85. See Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active
Learning Techniques and Metacognition in Law School: Shifting Energy from Professor
to Student, 81 UNIV. DETROIT MERCY L. REV. 1, 7-18 (2003).
182. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 12-13.
183. See Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting
Conversations about Women, the Academy and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 119 (1997) (combining the critiques of the model of lawyer as
“gladiator” promoted in law school and the profession’s marginalization of women and
people of color to argue that the model of lawyer should be recast to that of problem
solver, which would better address the needs of lawyers in society and serve to better
include all); Lerner, supra note 28; SYMPOSIUM, supra note 35.

690

QLR

[Vol. 23:643

B. What Would Emotionally Engaged Learning in Law School Look
Like?

1. Let Them In On The Secret.
For more than ten years, I have been teaching in a law school
clinical program in which the students represent real clients. I also
supervise externs, students whose clinical experience is with a legal
organization outside of the law school, where all of their case
supervision is by the organization’s lawyers. In our clinic my clinical
faculty colleagues and I supervise students representing clients of our
law school-based “teaching law office.” In the clinic seminar, we
include a class explicitly designed to introduce our students to the idea
that they come to their work with a broad array of values, assumptions,
judgments, expectations, emotional needs, etc. With our externs we use
the requirement that they maintain journals, which we read, and meet
with us on a regular basis to introduce them to the importance of their
own values and needs in assessing their sensory experiences, analyzing
situations, and making judgments. We try to demonstrate that their
values and emotional needs are based upon a lifetime of experience,
their particular lifetime of experience, but not that of others—even
others as similar to themselves as their classmates, let alone as different
from themselves as their clients. These issues include, of course, ethnic,
gender, religious, and class stereotypes, but also a hierarchy of values
covering a myriad of topics. We discuss, explicitly, theories about how
these “social intuitions” influence what they see and hear, and how they
interact with others, and make judgments. We ask them to consider
these issues as they go about the work of representing their clients; and
we urge them, too, to be patient with themselves, rather than overly selfcritical, as they work to become aware of what forces are influencing
their decision making, and gain control of them. Throughout the
semester in class and in supervision meetings we try to raise questions
to help them see where and why their internal self is influencing their
analytical and interpersonal work. Our semester is only fourteen weeks
long, but however skeptical and resistant the student may be when we
introduce the topic, most are convinced by the end of the semester that
they are not the “analytical machine” that they had previously supposed.
And, I have had many experiences of students who, by the end of the
term, were able to articulate some of the subtle forces operating within
themselves as they struggled with their clients’ problems.
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By helping our students to understand these principles, and
working with them to help them experience those forces in action in the
safe environment of our classes and supervised clinical work, we
increase their ability to understand and control their impact.
2. Reinforce Social Intuitions That Support Ethical Behavior and
Empathy, and the Appropriateness of Moral Considerations for the
Zealous Advocate.
The history of the legal profession’s role in representing
unpopular individuals and causes, and its history of ethical conduct,
while not without blemish, as well as my own observations as both
lawyer and law professor, leads me to think that the problem is not that
law school attracts only those who possess only selfish, competitive, or
uncaring social intuitions. Research demonstrates that most people have
intuitions towards empathy and justice.184And, where getting “the right
answer” is important we are motivated to pursue that goal.185 Perhaps
the problem is that law students learn only tools for their role as
instrumentalist lawyer, and not those that support their pro-social
intuitions. Perhaps if, in addition to tools for the traditional role of
zealous advocate, law school provided them with skills with which to
recognize the emotional pressures created by challenging professional
situations, and to design solutions that would support both their need to
represent their clients effectively, and their own pro-social intuitions,
they would be better able to make choices that would lead them to
recognizing and rejecting unethical or unprofessional actions, and
insisting on pursuing the “right,” i.e., ethical, professionally responsible
choice.
3. Moral Diversity, Open Discussion, and Reflective Lawyering in
a Law School Class.
According to Carrie Menkel-Meadow, beyond the mastery of
traditional lawyering skills, our students need to learn to pose such
questions, as:

184. See Steven L. Blader and Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Empathy: What Motivates
People to Help Others? in Michael Ross and Dale Miller (eds.) THE JUSTICE
MOTIVATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE, 226, 227-28 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2002).
185. Ziva Kunda, supra note 20, at 289.
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What are these parties trying to accomplish? [I.e., What are
their real goals, needs, interests, and priorities?] What are the
likely/possible needs or interests of other parties who may be
involved in the case or in important, ongoing or potential,
relationships with one or more of the parties? What is really at
stake?
What are the legal, social, economic, political,
psychological, moral, or ethical risks and benefits of litigation?
Of non-litigated outcomes? What other considerations might the
client be willing to entertain, if they were brought to awareness?
Are there ways to satisfy our client’s needs as well as all, or
some, of the needs of others? What other arrangements might be
better to deal with this problem? Why might they be better or
worse?186
I submit that they also need to ask themselves:
Are there motivations or expectations that I have that are
driving me toward, or away from, recommending, or even
considering, particular strategies or tactics? Are there individual
values or relationships, including, but not limited to those of my
client, that might be impacted differently by our selection of
strategy or tactics?
Beyond their mastery of formal analytical and argumentative skills,
students should be able to consider the values, or social intuitions that
underlie the choices they make, especially with respect to issues of
professional responsibility, and consider perspectives other than their
own, or that of the instrumentalist view of lawyering.187 They need to
be motivated to seek a morally and ethically appropriate solution, not
merely to construct a plausible argument that leads to a pre-determined
result. They need to have confidence that they can act in a morally
appropriate way, in order to avoid downshifting in the face of morally
challenging situations.
To achieve such goals, our students must become comfortable
dealing with what Jonathan Haidt, Evan Rosenberg, and Holly Hom
have referred to as “moral diversity.”188 However, as Haidt, Rosenberg,
186. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Problem-Solving Pedagogy Seriously: A
Response to the Attorney General, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 14, 15 (1999).
187. Frenkel, supra note 37, at 41-42.
188. Jonathan Haidt, et. al., Differentiating Diversities: Moral Diversity is Not Like
Other Kinds, 33 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1 (2003) (defining “moral diversity” as “the state
of a group when a substantial percentage of its members . . . does not value the most
valued moral goods of the community. Moral goods are social, personal, or spiritual
obligations (e.g., justice, social harmony, self-actualization, piety, chastity) to which one
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and Hom point out, there is a substantial body of social psychological
research that indicates that moral diversity in a group makes it difficult
for members to work together, because differences based upon “culture
and world view” lead to “desires for ostracism and punishment.”189
Their own studies of University of Virginia undergraduates confirm that
moral diversity reduces desires for interaction more than does
demographic diversity.190
At the same time, however, “participants [in their study] saw a
special value in diversity in educational contexts. . . . [They] seemed to
be saying that exposure to [moral] differences in the controlled and safe
setting of a class room was desirable.”191 The fact that students in the
Haidt, Rosenberg, and Hom study seemed to appreciate the value, and
have less fear, of moral diversity in an academic setting suggests that
just such a venue, or perhaps a law school classroom, might well be
appropriate for the introduction, open discussion, and reflection upon
morally diverse values.
Yet, practice does not necessarily make perfect. Rather, it makes
persistent. If we want students to consider with open minds the positive
weight of the moral values of others that differ from their own, and to
appreciate the implications to others, as well as the effectiveness for
their clients, of various behaviors, only feedback, discussion, reflection,
and follow-up, led by someone skilled at evaluating their work, and
communicating about it with them non-judgmentally, are likely to
produce that result.192 And they need the opportunity to reflect,
reconsider, and try again.193 Feedback and reflection also teaches
flexibility, transferability of knowledge, and that learning is built upon

appeals to justify or criticize the practices and behaviors of others, and which are felt to
be binding on all people. . . . Moral goods are experienced as affectively laden selfevident truths or intuitions. . . .”); see also id. at 5.
189. Id. at 6.
190. Id. at 30.
191. Haidt, et. al., supra note 118, at 30.
192. Cf. LEWIS ET AL., supra note 50 at 169-90 (discussing the lengthy and difficult
process of psychotherapy in revising the implicitly learned neural code that directs our
emotional lives); Haidt, supra note 50, at 829 (“Creating a community in which moral
talk was ubiquitous and in which adults model good moral thinking. And by talking
about evidence, justifications, and mitigating factors [with discourse partners who are
respected for their wisdom and judgment] more nuanced and ultimately more reasonable
judgments are likely to be produced.”).
193. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 58-60.
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prior learning.194 Feedback and reflection thus builds metacognition, the
ability to understand one’s own cognitive processes.195
4. Two Models of Instruction.
a. “Live Client” Clinics
Law school clinics in which students represent real clients offer a
unique opportunity to learn how to figure out what really is the problem,
to uncover what really is at stake, what unidentified relationships may
be critical to one or another of the parties as they work towards a
solution of the problem, etc. Student lawyers must examine and
understand the problem as presented by the client, theorize as to
potential solutions, plan and carry out legal research and factual
investigation, remain open to ongoing re-examination of the critical
issues, identify limits in their own knowledge and overcome those
limits, integrate knowledge from other disciplines or domains, learn,
build on their prior learning, exercise judgment, make choices and
experience their consequences. Moreover, as Eleanor W. Myers has
noted in assessing her simulation-based course, “Experience exerts a
powerful influence over the exercise of discretion. Experiential learning
is critical to moral development.”196 “[I]t is not until students actually
experience the reality of practice that they begin to internalize and make
their own moral and ethical judgments that are at the core of
practice.”197 Clinics, in which the students represent clients in real
matters under the close supervision of experienced lawyers/teachers,
thus provide a quintessential locale for emotional engagement of law
students in factually complex matters, challenging them to identify and
grapple with issues of professional responsibility. They also provide the
opportunity for frequent feedback and occasional modeling from
experts. In such an atmosphere implicit, emotional learning is likely to
take place.
At the same time, because they are “live,” every case is different
and quite unpredictable at the outset. Given such unpredictability, it

194.
195.
196.
04.
197.

Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 67.
MYERS, SIMPLE TRUTHS, supra note 152, at 835; Myers, supra note 37, at 403MYERS, SIMPLE TRUTHS, supra note 152, at 836.
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would be difficult to plan a problem solving or professional
responsibility curricular thread solely around live client clinics.
b. Problem-Based Learning
Between live client clinics and Langdellian reliance on appellate
opinions there should be a pedagogy, or pedagogies, that will enable law
students to engage in contextually rich, emotionally engaging,
experiential learning. Problem-Based Learning (P-BL)198 is one
approach that gives us guidance on how to satisfy those needs.
P-BL is based upon the principle that by engaging students’
interest and having them actively engaged in the learning process, the
students will learn how they learn, as well as learning the concepts with
which they are working to produce both more effective, usable
knowledge and long term “learning capability.”199 Using P-BL, students
develop an understanding of the facts and circumstances in which the
problem is situated, define, or redefine, the problem(s) or goal(s),
consider whatever competing interests may be involved, prioritize,
identify the nature and sources of the information needed to achieve the
goal, obtain that information, employ critical thinking, exercise
judgment, reconsider earlier conclusions or assumptions, make and
defend their decisions, reflect on their own learning process and results,
and work with the situation as it evolves over time.200 Essential to the
process is the participation of a mentor, who can assist the learners to
remain on task, collaborate, and encourage reflection on their work as
they proceed.201 For the reasons discussed below, P-BL can be expected

198. See, e.g., THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING (David Boud &
Graham I. Feletti eds., 2d ed. Kogan Page 1997) (critically examining problem based
learning in a variety of learning environments); THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED
LEARNING: A PRACTICAL “HOW TO” FOR TEACHING UNDERGRADUATE COURSES IN ANY
DISCIPLINE (Barbara J. Duch et al. eds., Stylus Publishing 2001) (outlining useful
strategies for how educators can introduce problem-based learning into their courses).
199. Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 2, 4; Barbara J. Duch et al., Why ProblemBased Learning? A Case Study of Institutional Change in Undergraduate Education, in
THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 6.
200. Barbara J. Duch et al., supra note 199, at 6; Barbara J. Duch, Writing Problems
for Deeper Understanding, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note
198, at 48-50; Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 1-2, Charles E. Engel, Not Just a
Method but a Way of Learning, in THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING,
supra note 198, at 19.
201. Deborah E. Allen & Harold B. White, III, Undergraduate Group Facilitators
to Meet the Challenges of Multiple Classroom Groups, in THE POWER OF PROBLEMBASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 79-92; Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 2.
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to produce more elaborately encoded patterns of neural connections of
the approach to problem solving demonstrated by professionals with
adaptive expertise, as well as the ability to examine problems from
multiple perspectives, which is essential to professionally responsible
conduct.
i. Motivating Students
Motivation stimulates attention and learning.202 Motivation can be
externally generated by the expectation of rewards or punishments (i.e.,
grades).203 However, learning tends to be more powerful when its
motivation is internally generated by the learner’s belief in the
usefulness of the learning.204 A belief that what one is doing has real
value to oneself or others is a powerful motivator.205 Most students
come to law school wanting to become lawyers. Thus, the more that
students feel that the problems they confront in law school actually
relate to the real world of lawyering, the greater their internal
motivation to engage with them and the greater their learning from that
experience.206
ii. Teaching Students to be Adaptive Problem Solvers
Langdellian, case-method, teaching provides the students with all
of the information they need from the statement of the problem to the
facts and legal authorities available for its solution. But lawyers seldom
have such luxury. Frequently, they help to clarify the question,
investigate the facts, recognize that over time everything, even the
202. KUNDA, supra note 20, at 211-16; HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 6061; Barbara J. Duch et al., Why Problem-Based Learning? A Case Study of Institutional
Change in Undergraduate Education, in THE POWER OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING,
supra note 176, at 6; Boud & Feletti, supra note 198, at 1-2; Cf. SYLWESTER, supra note
48, at 72; SCHACTER, supra note 54, at 44-45 acknowledging the importance of
motivation, but arguing that the encoding-making part of experience—is equally, if not
more essential.
203. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 60.
204. Id. at 61. Both SYLWESTER and Caine & Caine point out that external
motivation can actually limit a person’s internal motivation. SYLWESTER, supra note 48,
at 75-76; CAINE & CAINE, supra note 44, at 76-77. Accord, Dewey, supra note 74, at 67
(“There is, I think, no point in the philosophy of progressive education which is sounder
that its emphasis upon the importance of the participation of the learner in the formation
of the purposes which direct his activities in the learning process.”).
205. Id.
206. Dewey, supra note 74, at 67.
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client’s goals and priorities, may change, find, or create, the legal
principles that best support the client, and then marshal the evidence
that best supports the application of those principles. P-BL, by
providing limited information at the outset of the problem calls on the
students to engage in similar activities to those of the lawyer. Students
thus learn to exercise judgment to identify and obtain necessary
information to consider the implications of change over time, both
factually and legally, as well as relationships that might continue
beyond the solution of the presenting problem, to understand their own
thought processes, recognize the limits of their own knowledge, and to
identify and secure resources appropriate to the solution of the problem
(metacognition).
iii. Collaboration
P-BL advocates consistently urge that students be required to work
in teams for several reasons. First, it brings together the collective skills
of the team members,207 demonstrating the appropriateness and value of
collaboration to work and scholarship.208 Collaboration reduces the
individual student’s sense of isolation, which tends to improve
performance.209 Less isolation may produce less fear and thus, less
“downshifting.”210 Students are likely to be motivated to be able to
contribute to the team’s goals, thereby increasing their emotional
engagement with the problem.211 Collaboration requires them to make
decisions and to communicate effectively to their teammates the
evidence and reasons supporting those decisions.212 It thereby improves
both reasoning and communication skills.213 The process of working in
teams also generates appreciation for differences in learning and

207.
208.

Barbara J. Duch et al., supra note 199, at 6.
Barbara J. Duch et al., Strategies for Using Groups, in THE POWER OF
PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 60.
209. Id.
210. Id.; see discussion supra pp. 678-80.
211. See “Motivating Students,” supra p. 696; “The Importance of Emotion in
Creating Memory,” supra pp. 668-70. Of course, some students may take the
opportunity of group work to avoid responsibility and work, expecting that others will
do it. But even that has consequences that may, if it is identified, articulated and
addressed, provide important learning about ethical judgment.
212. Barbara J. Duch, Writing Problems for Deeper Understanding, in THE POWER
OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 49-50.
213. Barbara J. Duch et al., supra note 199, at 6.
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communication styles, increasing social maturity.214 Collaboration can
significantly increase one’s exposure to other perspectives, and values.
Although most lawyers work collaboratively in addressing clients’
problems, in most law school course work collaboration is a violation of
the honor code. Thus students learn, implicitly, and with powerful
emotional stakes, not to ask for support from, or give support to, others
in solving legal problems. In my observations, even in my
interdisciplinary clinic in which all of the work is done in teams,
students demonstrate that they have somehow acquired the belief that
asking for support is a sign of weakness or incompetence. Moreover,
law schools provide no support for creating, effectively using, or
evaluating collaborations. Most law students learn the skills of group
process and collaboration only by chance.
Collaboration, however, is an immeasurably valuable tool in
addressing ethical problems. When Milgram varied his electric shock
experiments in ways that involved a third person being present, even
those that were known to be confederates of the “experimenter” the
subject almost always refused to proceed to highest level of shock for
the “learner.”215 The support of colleagues, friends, family, teachers,
therapists, spiritual advisors, indeed anyone that we trust, can be of
immeasurable help in sorting out our feelings, values, needs, and
expectations, as well as clarifying the evidence and issues, and
identifying options. We need to inculcate in our students an acceptance
that seeking support to discuss one’s feelings about the appropriateness
of behaviors that one is being asked to condone, especially when one
feels any qualms about the ethics or morality of the action, is an
appropriate element of the exercise of professional judgment and not a
sign of incompetence or disloyalty.
Carol Buckner, for example, uses small groups (3-5 students)
within her large first year civil procedure course to develop not only the
ability of the students to work cooperatively, but also better
understanding by all students of the core concepts of the course,
individual accountability, and self-directed learning—all important
qualities for lawyers.216 In her course, the instructor selects the groups to

214. Id.; Barbara J. Duch et al., Strategies for Using Groups, in THE POWER OF
PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 60.
215. Marta Laupa, et al, supra note 78, at 161-63.
216. See Carol Bruckner, “EXPERT LEARNING AND EQUITY ANDROGENY:
Integrating Dynamic Groups into First Year Courses to Develop Self-Regulated
Learning,” presentation and materials from “Active Teaching and Learning” Eleventh
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assure both diversity and that students don’t merely choose to work with
those with whom they have established relationships. Exercises are
developed for all, or most of the classes in which the small groups,
which remain constant throughout the course, work together to solve
some problem. Frequently there are also out-of-class problems that the
groups are assigned. For each group problem, one or more of the groups
are required to report on their discussions and conclusions to the class.
When group work is assigned during class time, the instructor circulates
through the class to monitor that the group is working appropriately.217
My experience teaching an interdisciplinary, live client clinic in
which students represent their clients (children in dependency court
proceedings) in teams consisting of a law student, a social work
graduate student and a medical student or resident has convinced me
that the students learn far more from their collaborators, and the process,
than they could possibly have learned working alone.
However, as anyone who has read Lord of the Flies,218 or observed
a group of unsupervised children at play, knows group work can get
messy and even counterproductive,219 not to mention emotionally
harmful. To avoid those pitfalls, and keep the group on task and really
collaborating—as opposed to competing or engaging in “parallel
play”—a group facilitator is required.220 In their course, Eleanor W.
Myers and Nancy Knauer, used practitioners who, as adjunct faculty,
met periodically with the students in small groups.221 In “Law and
Lawyering in the Workplace,”222 Professor Sturm and I were able to
perform that role assisted by one teaching assistant because we
controlled the class size. In my law school’s first year legal writing
course, carefully selected and trained third year students, under the
supervision of the faculty head of the program are the facilitators. In
live client clinics, the clinical supervisors perform this function for the
teams of students they supervise.

Annual Conference of the Institute for Law School Teaching, Gonzaga University
School of Law (2004), 4-6, on file with author.
217. Id.
218. WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (Perigee Trade 1959).
219. See Jonathan Haidt, et. al., supra note 118, at 5-7.
220. Deborah E. Allen & Harold B. White, III, Undergraduate Group Facilitators
to Meet the Challenges of Multiple Classroom Groups, in THE POWER OF PROBLEMBASED LEARNING, supra note 176, at 80-83.
221. Myers, supra note 37, at 407-08.
222. Lerner, supra note 28.
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C. Teaching Our Students to Avoid Downshifting
Downshifting occurs when the situation creates too high a level of
stress, for example, when it appears to the individual to pose an
insoluble problem, and the risk of error is too great. If law students are
placed in realistic, though simulated, situations involving ethical
dilemmas comparable to those faced by lawyers, supported in their
efforts to solve the problem, given the opportunity to reflect on their
work, individually, among their peers, and with supervision, so that they
can see what worked, what did not, and why, and what other options
might have been considered, actively encouraged to consider multiple
perspectives and the ethical dimensions throughout the process, and
called on to repeat that process at various points throughout law school,
the implicit messages will be (1) that seeking and applying ethically
correct answers is important for lawyers; (2) that these problems are
soluble; and (3) that they are competent to solve them. They will have
felt the intellectual, emotional, and moral challenge of the problem.
Likely, they will have experienced trial and error, without dire
consequences, but rather the opportunity for reflective consideration of
their process and others that they might have pursued. They will be
supported to value identifying and working towards an ethical solution
to problems, rather than merely making an argument to achieve
predetermined outcomes. They will understand the relevant concepts, in
the contexts in which they arise, and have a bank of experience to call
on in addressing moral and ethical problems when they arise in “real
life.” Given such experience and knowledge as law students, they
should be less likely to respond automatically, or to downshift, and
more likely to engage their sophisticated cognitive powers when such
dilemmas arise in practice.
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D. Adapting Problem-Based Learning to Law School
Adapting P-BL to legal education should not be difficult.223 For
example, Professors Eleanor W. Myers and Nancy Knauer teach an
“Integrated Transactional Practice Course” (ITP), in which they
combine the teaching of Trusts and Estates and Professional
Responsibility using “long-term, live simulations”224 The course was
designed starting with the desired progression of the trusts and estates
issues, then building in professional responsibility problems in a
sequence that Myers says “developed naturally.”225 They use six client
files, which they have attempted to make realistic. In so doing, they
have created the underlying “stories” of “the parties, their lawyers, their
decisions and choices, and provide a full description of the factual
context in which the matter arose.”226 The students grapple with the
problems in the “first person,” experiencing the challenges, and the
emotion of exercising discretion and judgment, and assuming personal
responsibility.227 Throughout the course, the faculty is available as
“mentors” to facilitate discussion of substantive, strategic and ethical
issues.228
For many years, New York University Law School has had a first
year course, “The Lawyering Program,” in which small groups of
students, frequently sub-divided into smaller teams, address a series of
problems typical of problems faced by lawyers in daily practice.
Teaching both legal “analysis” and lawyering “skills” are goals of the
course. Imbedded in certain of the problems, e.g., counseling and
223. For an example of P-BL in non-US style (i.e., undergraduate) legal education,
see Keith Winsor, Applying Problem-Based Learning to Practical Legal Training, in
THE CHALLENGE OF PROBLEM-BASED LEARNING, supra note 198, at 224-32 (discussing
the creation and implementation of the Practical Skills Course taught at the College of
Law, New South Wales, Australia). For a discussion of the use of P-BL in medical
education, see T.J. David and Leena Patel, Adult Learning Theory, Problem Based
Learning, And Pediatrics, 73 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDREN, 357 (October, 1997).
In addition, Professor Myers has offered to share her “Nuts and Bolts Suggestions for
Integrated Education” with anyone who asks. Myers, supra note 37, at 401, n. 1.
224. Myers, supra note 37.
225. Id. at 405.
226. Id. at 406.
227. Id. at 411. In order to create simulations that are realistic and emotionally
engaging, law schools can use scripted parts for clients and witnesses played by
professional actors or repeat performing amateurs much as medical schools use
“standardized patients.” See Lawrence M. Grossberg, Medical Education Again
Provides A Model For Law Schools: The Standardized Patient Becomes the
Standardized Client, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 212 (2001).
228. Myers, supra note 37, at 408-10.
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negotiating, are ethical issues. There is detailed faculty feedback after
each exercise.229
A less ambitious example was “Law and Lawyering In The Work
Place,”230 in which Susan Sturm and I, using employment discrimination
law as our subject matter, created a series of problems for each segment
of the course. Each problem required the application of the doctrinal
principles covered in the current course segment and built upon the
work done earlier in the semester. For each, the students were required
to act “in role” and to employ different skills that lawyers regularly use
in representing their clients. A number of the problems required the
students to work collaboratively. After each role play, we provided
feedback to the individual students as well as to the class as a whole.
Frequently, lawyers, or other experts (e.g., police officials, statisticians,
women’s rights advocates, etc.) participated in the problems, and also
provided feedback.
The National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA) has been
teaching trial skills to lawyers and law students for thirty years, using
both individual problems (i.e., short, fact statements focused on a
particular skill), and entire mock “case files” that call upon the
“students” to read the factual material, decide on the legal and factual
theories they will pursue, marshal the evidence and legal arguments they
need, anticipate their adversaries theories and arguments and prepare to
meet them, prepare their witnesses, decide upon and obtain trial
exhibits, and then perform the trial under the scrutiny of experts, who
provide feedback. From the experience of the NITA model, a number
of law schools have developed integrated courses which teach evidence,
trial advocacy and professional responsibility.231

229. Materials on file with author. For examples of other first year courses in
lawyering, which incorporate some or all of the principal elements of P-BL, see, e.g.,
Franklin M. Schultz, Teaching “Lawyering” To First Year Students: An Experiment In
Constructing Legal Competence, 52 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. 1643 (1995) (describing
the first year lawyering course at Washington and Lee Law School); Nancy M. Maurer
and Linda Fitts Mischler, Introduction To Lawyering: Teaching First Year Students To
Think Like Professionals, 44 J. LEGAL ED. 96 (March, 1994) (describing the first year
lawyering course at Albany Law School); Dean Braverman, Law Firm: A First-Year
Course On Lawyering, 39 J. LEGAL ED. 501 (discussing the first year lawyering course
at Syracuse University Law School).
230. See Lerner, supra note 28.
231. I am personally familiar with the courses at Temple University’s Beasley
School of Law, and Widener University Law School where I have participated as a
faculty member, and the one at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, where I
teach.
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Examples of courses which integrate problem solving with
professional responsibility are also available.232 The Center For
Professionalism at The University of Pennsylvania Law School
produced videos of a number of factually complex “stories” in which
professional responsibility issues were imbedded. These videos were
widely used to educate law students, lawyers, and judges. Their model
was to present a segment of a “story,” stop, have the audience, guided
by a trained presenter, discuss the facts, and identify and address
whatever ethical issues they spotted, and before moving on to the next
segment in which the story continued. Each segment included actual
ethical problems and/or conduct that might well lead to such problems if
followed.233
David Luban and Michael Millman have developed a live client
clinical course which consciously incorporates professional
responsibility as a for-credit element of the course.234
In his Professional Responsibility course, Douglas Frenkel
consciously seeks to create an environment in which his students “can
experience a situation on both intellectual and emotional planes. [By
placing them] in unresolved situations that are complex in terms of
variables internal[ly] and external[ly] . . . with current facts unclear,
future consequences undefined, and resolution susceptible to several
choices”235 He uses problems taken from real cases, places students in
role, and encourages collaboration among the students.236 At the
conclusion of each problem he leads discussion and reflection among
the class members.237

232. See articles discussing a variety of efforts to improve the teaching of
Professional Responsibility, including efforts to integrate that subject matter with
various substantive courses, some with efforts to place the students “in role” such as
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 28.
233. Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr. et al., Teaching Legal Ethics: Exploring the Continuum,
58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 159, 159-160 (1995).
234. Luban & Milman, supra note 37.
235. Frenkel, supra note 37, at 29.
236. Id. at 33, 35, 39-40; see also Carol Bruckner, supra note 241.
237. Id. at 41.
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E. When and Where to Engage the Students

1. Start in the First Year
The University of California at Berkeley’s Boalt Hall Law School
experimented with a three year program introducing legal ethics in the
first year curriculum and then discarded the idea, opting to move the
course to the second year, in large measure because of a combination of
student and faculty opposition.238 Students regarded the two credit
course as less important than their other course work, described the
study of legal ethics as “patronizing, preachy, irrelevant, or
intellectually soft,”239 and evaluated the instructors’ performance
significantly below that of their other teachers.240 For their part, faculty
felt that by including the course in the first year, students suffered
because they lacked “exposure to relevant advanced courses” and had
little, if any, practice experience.241 Other schools have also tried, and
rejected, the idea. Nevertheless, I submit that there are useful reasons
for introducing professional responsibility into the first year curriculum.
First, assuming that we are fighting a battle to overcome, or
reinforce in the face of negative learning in law school, students’ social
intuitions, the sooner we get started the better. Three years offers more
opportunity than two.
Second, students arrive at law school excited to be initiated into the
world of law and lawyering. They are emotionally prepared to accept
that learning from their first year courses and professors. What we
omit, as what we include in the first year curriculum, sends an implicit,
but readily learned, message about what we think—no, what we
“know”—is important for lawyers to do, and therefore for law students
to learn. Consequently, “it is what is imprinted in that initial immersion
and not any broader messages of the three years, that shapes the
students’ consciousness of what is important and not important to being
a lawyer.”242 Again, if it is their intuitions, developed over many years,

238. Stephen McG. Bundy, Ethics Education in the First Year: An Experiment, 58
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 19, 25 (1995).
239. Id. at 27.
240. Id. at 25.
241. Id. at 28.
242. Lesnick, supra note 87, at 1159; see also, Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics
Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Course in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 719, 735-36 (1998) (urging that law schools promote the importance of legal ethics
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that we are trying to overcome or reinforce in connection with their
roles as lawyers, we can expect them to be more open to that in the first
year before they become jaded. My experience with the Law &
Lawyering In The Workplace243 course convinced me that by the end of
one semester of law school, we have effectively inculcated in our
students the “three principles” of legal problem solving. Thereafter, it is
difficult to get them to “unlearn” that process or to supplement it with
broader considerations that are necessary for the problem solving
necessary in representing clients in the practice of law.
Surely the first year curriculum is important and crowded. Yet, I
know of no evidence that teaching first year students to engage in
creative problem solving would interfere with their learning traditional
legal analysis. I also know of no evidence that a first semester, or first
year, of law school which devoted less than 100% of course time to
teaching only the traditional approach to legal problem solving would,
in any manner or degree, impair law students’ analytical abilities, or
other functioning as lawyers. Hence, I must conclude that teaching
broad based problem solving techniques in the first year would be a
valuable addition to the legal education of our students.
Problems of design for the inclusion of professional responsibility
in the first year curriculum can be overcome. Deborah Rhode,244 Carrie
Menkel-Meadow,245 and others have developed such materials.
Moreover, faculty who teach in the first year curriculum are certainly
capable of learning to use such materials in order to make their
inclusion meaningful, and effective.246
2. Teach Pervasively
Deborah Rhode argues that law students can best understand by
having ethical issues arise in all of their courses.247 Her position is
supported by the recent research on memory, discussed above in Part II.
by making it a required, three credit, first year, first semester course and an upper level
course as well, and also incorporate ethics into all courses).
243. See discussion, supra note 28.
244. See generally RHODE, supra note 16.
245. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 186.
246. Note that in the second and third year iterations of its first year professional
responsibility course, Boalt Hall added problems drawn from practice, role plays, small
group work, increased faculty feed back and role plays explicitly tied to development of
lawyering skills. As a result, students’ reaction to the course, and teacher evaluations
dramatically improved. Bundy, supra note 238, at 26-27.
247. RHODE, supra note 16, at 4-5.
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Moreover, as we have seen, understanding, and learning to apply the
transferability of learning requires that we teach it in multiple
contexts.248 Professional responsibility problems arise in every type of
practice, in every subject matter, and perhaps every day, for lawyers. If
we want law students to be prepared to recognize and address ethical
issues as part of their every day practice of law those problems should
present themselves as part of their “everyday” legal education in order
that elaborately encoded implicit memory for those experiences is
created. If students encountered ethical issues in five different courses,
they would have the opportunity of recognizing them in five different
contexts. Engaging with ethical issues under the tutelage of five
different professors is also likely to produce a much richer learning
experience than doing so with only one.
V. CONCLUSION
“A rational approach to curriculum design would begin with an
assessment of the law school’s mission and of the kind of student we
wish to train and would then attempt to divine an appropriate blend and
sequence law, institutions, skills, perspectives and professional
issues.”249 For many years, the legal profession has recognized that the
kind of lawyers that clients, the profession, and the community needs,
are those who can carry out their professional responsibilities as
representatives of their clients, officers of the judicial system, and
public citizens exercising moral and ethical judgment of the highest
order.250 Unfortunately, most law schools have either not accepted as a
significant part of their mission the role of training law students for that
practice mode, or otherwise ignored Professor Gorman’s admonition.251
Consequently, prevalent law school curriculum and pedagogy are not
well suited to producing lawyers well equipped for either role. Seeing
this, many law professors have experimented with course design and
delivery seeking to impart these traits and practices to their students.
Recent discoveries in social psychology and neuroscience demonstrate
rather clearly that a pedagogy based upon contextually rich, emotionally
engaging, role-based, problem solving, coupled with ongoing reflective

248. HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note 173, at 62-63, 68-69.
249. Robert A. Gorman, Introduction, Curriculum Developments: A Symposium, 39
J. LEG. ED. 469 (December 1989).
250. MODEL RULES, Preamble.
251. Gorman, supra note 249, at 469.
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discourse is most likely to significantly enhance law students’ effective
engagement with, and mastery of, the role of ethical practitioner. It is
now up to us to engage that learning in our teaching.

